Search and Endogenous Concentration of Liquidity in Asset Markets

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Abstract

We develop a search-based model of asset trading, in which investors of different horizons can invest in two identical assets. The asset markets are partially segmented: buyers can search for only one of the assets, but can decide which one. We show that there exists a “clientele” equilibrium where one market has more buyers and sellers, lower search times, higher trading volume, higher prices, and short-horizon investors. This equilibrium dominates the ones where the two markets are identical, implying that the concentration of liquidity in one asset is socially desirable. At the same time, too many buyers decide to search for the liquid asset.

Keywords: Liquidity, Search, Asset pricing, On-the-run bonds

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1 Introduction

Financial assets with similar payoffs can often differ substantially in their liquidity. A well-known example is the on-the-run phenomenon in the US Treasury market. On-the-run (i.e., just-issued) bonds are significantly more liquid (and, as a result, more expensive) than off-the-run bonds with comparable maturities.\(^1\) Similar phenomena exist in other countries (e.g., Canada, Germany, Japan), and liquidity can sometimes be concentrated in off-the-run bonds instead.\(^2\) The differences in liquidity can also concern broader asset classes: for example, government bonds are similar in terms of default risk to bonds issued by many government agencies or AAA-rated corporations, but are substantially more liquid than these other bonds.

That assets with similar payoffs can differ substantially in their liquidity, raises several interesting questions. Why do such differences in liquidity exist? Are assets substitutes in terms of liquidity, i.e., is the concentration of liquidity in one asset at the expense of others? If so, is this concentration of liquidity desirable from a welfare viewpoint? These are the questions we study in this paper.

A prerequisite for our analysis is a theory of liquidity. We use a theory which is relatively novel in a financial market context, and is based on search. That is, we assume that investors do not trade in a centralized marketplace, but have to search for counterparties. Thus, an asset’s liquidity is related to the ease of locating a counterparty. While many financial markets do involve a centralized location, they also involve an element of search. For example, in many bond markets, investors can trade with dealers that they can easily locate. However, dealers need to rebalance their inventories, and to do so they often need to search for counterparties. Moreover, dealers’ ability to execute this search efficiently (by knowing which investors are likely to be interested in a specific transaction), affects the

\(^1\)For example, a just-issued 10-year bond is more liquid than a 10-year bond issued three months ago, and much more liquid than a 30-year bond issued 20 years ago. Some evidence on the on-the-run phenomenon can be found in Sundaresan (1997, pp.16-18), where it is reported that trading volume for on-the-run bonds is about 10 times as large as for their off-the-run counterparts. Warga (1992) finds that yields of on-the-run bonds are on average 55 basis points below those of their off-the-run counterparts.

\(^2\)For example, Boudoukh and Whitelaw (1991) document the benchmark effect in the Japanese government bond market, whereby the vast majority (about 90\%) of trading volume is concentrated in one “benchmark” bond. This bond trades at an average of 60 basis points below other bonds with comparable maturities, and is not always the one most recently issued.
prices they quote in the market.\(^3\) We should add that some financial markets are even closer to the search paradigm, because investors do not trade in a centralized location, but locate counterparties through brokers.\(^4\)

Our model is as follows. A constant flow of investors enter into a market, seeking to buy one of two identical, infinitely-lived assets. After buying an asset, investors become “inactive” asset owners, until the time when they seek to sell. We model trading motives in a reduced form, assuming that investors become sellers when their valuation of asset dividends switches to a lower value.\(^5\) The rate of valuation switch is inversely related to investors’ horizons, and we assume that horizons are heterogeneous across investors.

The main feature of our model is that buyers and sellers meet through a decentralized search process, rather than in a centralized market. For simplicity, we assume that the search process involves no brokers and dealers, but investors search for counterparties themselves. We also assume that investors seeking to buy one of the two assets must decide which one, and then can search only in that asset’s market. This market segmentation assumption is important for our analysis: if investors could execute a simultaneous search in both markets, the two assets would have the same set of prospective buyers, and the same liquidity and price. One interpretation of this assumption is that investors search through brokers, and are constrained to give simple instructions, concerning only one asset.\(^6\)

We show that there exists an asymmetric equilibrium, where the assets differ in their liquidity. The market of the more liquid asset has more buyers and sellers, and thus lower search times and higher trading volume. Moreover, prices are higher in that market, reflecting the premium that buyers are willing to pay for the lower search times. The tradeoff between

\(^3\) For example, in describing the US corporate bond market, Garbade (1982, pp.436-437) says: “Liquidity in the corporate bond market is not derived by knowing what is available and what is being sought in the form of active bids and offerings... Instead, it is derived by knowing what may be available from, or what may be sold to, public investors.... A corporate bond dealer will quote some bid price if a customer wants to sell an issue, but he is likely to quote a better price if he thinks he knows of the existence of another buyer to whom he can quickly resell the same issue.” (Emphasis in original)

\(^4\) This is often the case for investors needing to execute large transactions. In several bond markets, for example, dealers do not take large transactions, but instead act as brokers and search for a counterparty. Amihud and Mendelson (1991) emphasize the search costs inherent in large transactions, in the context of off-the-run Treasury notes: “Investors who wish to trade a large quantity of notes have to go through considerable search in order to arrange the quantity desired, imposing an additional fixed cost of search.”

\(^5\) Such a switch can capture the effect of a liquidity shock or of a hedging need arising from a position in another market.

\(^6\) We further discuss this assumption in Section 2.
prices and search times gives rise to a clientele effect: buyers with high switching rates, who have a stronger preference for lower search times, prefer the liquid asset, while the opposite holds for the more patient, low-switching-rate buyers. The clientele effect is, in turn, what generates the higher trading volume in the liquid asset: high-switching-rate buyers turn faster into sellers, thus generating more turnover.

The liquidity premium and clientele effect in our model are analogous to those in the literature on asset pricing with transaction costs.\(^7\) In that literature, however, transaction costs are exogenous, while in our model they derive from the search times which are endogenously determined in equilibrium. Deriving transaction costs endogenously allows us to study their joint determination across multiple assets, and to show that they can differ even when the assets are otherwise identical. Furthermore, modelling transaction costs through search generates empirical predictions which are unique to our model. For example, the higher prices in the more liquid market are sustained because the buyer-seller ratio is higher in that market. Thus, a unique prediction of our model is that the ratio of sellers’ search times to those of buyers (which is equal to the buyer-seller ratio) should be higher in more liquid markets.\(^8\)

In addition to the asymmetric (“clientele”) equilibrium, there exist symmetric ones, where the two markets are identical in terms of prices and buyers’ search times. Comparing the two types of equilibria reveals, in the context of our model, whether the concentration of liquidity in one asset is socially desirable. As a benchmark for this comparison, we determine the socially optimal allocation of entering buyers across the two markets. Under this allocation, the measure of sellers differs across markets, and so do the buyers’ search times (which are inversely related to the measure of sellers). Such a dispersion is optimal so that the markets can cater to different clienteles: buyers with high switching rates go to the market with the lower search times, while the opposite holds for low-switching-rate buyers.

In the symmetric equilibria the buyers’ search times are identical across markets, while


\(^8\) While data on search times might not be easily available, one could use data on dealers’ inventories. If dealers rebalance their inventories partly through search, the rate at which inventories revert to their long-run mean from below (above) is a measure of the time it takes to find a seller (buyer).
in the clientele equilibrium some dispersion exists. A sufficient condition for the clientele equilibrium to dominate the symmetric ones is that this dispersion does not exceed the socially optimal level. To examine whether this is the case, we consider the social optimality of buyers’ entry decisions in the clientele equilibrium. We show that despite the higher prices, buyers do not fully internalize the relatively short supply of sellers in the liquid market, and enter excessively in that market. This pushes the measure of sellers in the liquid market below the socially optimal level, and has the same effect on the dispersion in buyers’ search times. Thus, the clientele equilibrium dominates the symmetric ones.

The notion that liquidity can be concentrated in one market has already been pointed out in the literature. Pagano (1989) studies a model where investors can trade in one of two markets to share risk. He shows that the two markets can coexist, but this equilibrium is generally dominated by the one where all trade is concentrated in one market.\(^9\) The key difference between our analysis and Pagano’s is that we consider the concentration of liquidity across assets, rather than markets. In the case of markets, all investors can migrate in one market and benefit from the enhanced liquidity. In the case of assets, however, equilibrium requires that some investors hold each asset. Thus, the concentration of liquidity in one asset can hurt the investors in the other, and it is not obvious a priori whether this benefits investors as a whole.

Some papers study the concentration of liquidity in the presence of asymmetric information. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) show that if uninformed traders have discretion over the timing of their trades, they will all trade at times when the market is more liquid. This reduces the informational content of order flow at those times, and is precisely what makes the market more liquid. Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) show that uninformed traders can all choose to trade in one of multiple locations for similar reasons. As in Pagano (1989), these papers concern the concentration of liquidity across markets (defined by time or location), rather than assets. Moreover, the welfare analysis is somewhat complicated because of the existence of noise traders.\(^10\) Finally, asymmetric information models are not very applica-

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\(^9\)See also Ellison and Fudenberg (2003) for a general analysis of the coexistence of two markets, and Economides and Siow (1988) for a spatial model of market formation.

\(^10\)An additional limitation of many asymmetric information models is that they assume risk-neutral market makers who can hold an asset forever. (See, for example, Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Kyle (1985), and the papers mentioned in the paragraph above.) These agents set the price of an asset to the expected value of payoffs, and thus there are no liquidity premia. Some asymmetric information models can, however, generate
ble to the on-the-run phenomenon, because the extent of asymmetric information in the
government bond market is quite limited.

The link between liquidity and search is emphasized in Lippman and McCall (1986). Duffie, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2001) are the first to integrate search into an equilibrium model of asset price formation. Our model builds on their framework, extending it to multiple assets and heterogeneous investors. Independent work by Weill (2003) considers a search model with multiple assets, and shows how an asset’s liquidity premium is related to the asset’s free float, defined as the measure of sellers in that asset’s market. This relationship (which can also be derived in our model) holds because the measure of sellers determines the buyers’ search times, and thus the buyers’ willingness to enter into an asset’s market. Weill considers a general number of assets and allows for their supplies to differ, while we consider only two assets in equal supply. At the same time, we allow for investor heterogeneity, which leads to multiple equilibria and the associated welfare analysis.

Our welfare analysis of entry decisions in the clientele equilibrium parallels that in Diamond’s (1982) labor market model. Diamond shows that in the presence of search, workers’ wages and marginal products can differ. In our model, investors’ expected utilities and marginal products can also differ, and we explore how this divergence affects the liquidity of the two markets.

Finally, Boudoukh and Whitelaw (1993) develop a model in which two identical bonds differ in their liquidity. In their model, liquidity is determined by the bonds’ issuer, and allowing it to differ across bonds maximizes the issuer’s revenue. In our model, by contrast, liquidity is determined by the market.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 determines investor populations, expected utilities, and prices, taking entry decisions as given. Section 4 endogenizes entry decisions, and determines the set of market equilibria. The welfare analysis of the concentration of liquidity is in Section 5. Section 6 considers the case where investment horizons are private information, and Section 7 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Model

Time is continuous and goes from 0 to $\infty$. There are two assets, 1 and 2, traded in markets 1 and 2, respectively. Both assets pay a constant flow $\delta$ of dividends and are in supply $S$.

Investors are risk-neutral and have a discount rate equal to $r$. Upon entering the economy, they seek to buy one unit of either asset 1 or asset 2. After buying the asset, they become "inactive" asset owners, until the time when they seek to sell the asset. Thus, there are three groups of investors: buyers, inactive owners, and sellers. To model trading motives, we assume that upon entering the economy investors enjoy the full value $\delta$ of the dividend flow, but their valuation can switch to a lower value $\delta - x$ at a rate $\kappa$. (The parameter $x > 0$ can capture, in a reduced-form manner, the effect of a liquidity shock, of a hedging need arising from a position in another market, etc.) Buyers and inactive owners enjoy the full value $\delta$ of the dividend flow. Buyers experiencing a switch to low valuation simply exit the economy. Inactive owners experiencing the switch become sellers, and upon selling the asset, they also exit the economy.

We treat investors as infinitesimal, and denote by $f$ the flow of investors entering the economy. We assume that investors are heterogeneous in their horizons, i.e., some have a long horizon, and some a shorter one. In our model, horizons are inversely related to the switching rates $\kappa$ to low valuation. Thus, we can describe the investor heterogeneity by a function $\hat{f}(\kappa)$ such that the flow of investors entering the economy with switching rates in $[\kappa, \kappa + d\kappa]$ is $\hat{f}(\kappa)d\kappa$. Denoting the support of $\hat{f}(\kappa)$ by $[\underline{\kappa}, \overline{\kappa}]$, we have $\int_{\underline{\kappa}}^{\overline{\kappa}} \hat{f}(\kappa)d\kappa = f$. To avoid technicalities, we assume that the function $\hat{f}(\kappa)$ is continuous and strictly positive.

The main feature of our model is that buyers and sellers meet through a decentralized search process, rather than in a centralized market. As discussed in the Introduction, search plays an important role in many financial markets. Many markets, in particular, are pure search markets, where investors employ brokers to locate counterparties. Moreover, even in dealer markets, where investors trade with dealers that they can easily locate, dealers often need to search for counterparties to rebalance their inventory. For simplicity, in our model we abstract from several features of actual markets. In particular, we do not consider brokers and dealers, but assume that investors must search for counterparties themselves. Moreover,
we assume a continuum of buyers and sellers, rather than a small number as is the case in many markets where search plays an important role. Needless to say, incorporating the above features could enrich our model and provide new insights.

In addition to assuming that the asset markets operate through search, we assume that they are partially segmented. That is, we restrict the investors seeking to buy an asset to search in only one market, while allowing them to decide which market this is. This assumption is crucial: if investors could execute a simultaneous search in both markets, the two assets would have the same set of prospective buyers, and the same liquidity and price. One interpretation of this assumption is that investors search through brokers, and are constrained to give simple instructions, covering only one asset.\textsuperscript{11}

Summarizing, we can describe the two markets by the flow diagram in Figure 1. To each market are associated three groups of investors: buyers, inactive owners, and sellers. Investors entering the economy come from the pool of outside investors, and investors exiting the economy return to that pool.

To describe the search process, we need to specify the rate at which buyers meet with sellers. We assume that an investor seeking to trade meets investors from the overall population according to a Poisson process with a fixed arrival rate. Consequently, meetings with investors seeking the opposite side of the trade occur at a rate proportional to the measure of that investor group. Denoting the coefficient of proportionality by $\lambda$, and the measures of buyers and sellers in market $i$ by $\mu^i_b$ and $\mu^i_s$, respectively, a buyer in market $i$ meets with sellers at the rate $\lambda \mu^i_s$, and a seller meets with buyers at the rate $\lambda \mu^i_b$. Moreover, the overall flow of meetings in market $i$ is $\lambda \mu^i_b \mu^i_s$.

When a buyer meets with a seller, the price is determined through bilateral bargaining.\textsuperscript{11} Alternatively, if investors’ and brokers’ objectives are not fully aligned, investors might give simple instructions to limit brokers’ flexibility. For example, given the flexibility to search for one of multiple assets, a broker would have more opportunities to contact a seller who does not offer the best deal from the buyer’s viewpoint, but whose business the broker values.

A different interpretation of the market segmentation assumption is that different brokers specialize in different assets (for example, government vs. corporate bonds). If each investor must trade through only one broker (because of fixed costs or implicit restrictions), then investors would effectively be restricted to searching in only one market.

Finally, we should note that our assumption does not preclude investors from searching in one market, and then switching and searching in the other. The essence of our assumption is that at a given point in time, investors cannot be searching simultaneously in both markets.
We assume that the bargaining game takes a simple form, where one party is randomly selected to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer. The probability of the buyer being selected is $z/(1 + z)$, where the parameter $z > 0$ measures the buyer’s bargaining power.

Because buyers differ in their switching rates $\kappa$, they have different reservation values in the bargaining game. This can complicate the bargaining game because it can introduce asymmetric information. For simplicity, we mainly focus on the symmetric information case, where buyers’ switching rates are observable to the sellers. For example, switching rates can correspond to buyers’ observable institutional characteristics (e.g., insurance companies have a long horizon, while hedge funds a shorter one). We consider the asymmetric information in Section 6, and show that under plausible conditions, our results carry through.
### 3 Analysis

In this section, we take as given the investors’ decisions as to which market to enter. We then determine the measures of buyers, inactive owners, and sellers in each market, the expected utilities of the investors in each group, and the market prices. Throughout, we focus on steady states, where all of the above are constant over time.

#### 3.1 Demographics

We denote by $\nu^i(\kappa)$ the fraction of investors with switching rate $\kappa$ who decide to enter into market $i$. We also denote by $\mu_o^i$ the measure of inactive owners in market $i$, and recall that the measures of buyers and sellers are denoted by $\mu_b^i$ and $\mu_s^i$, respectively.

Because buyers and inactive owners are heterogeneous in their switching rates $\kappa$, we need to consider the distribution of switching rates within each population. (This distribution is not the same as for the investors entering the market, because investors with different switching rates exit the market at different speeds.) To describe the distribution of switching rates within the population of buyers in market $i$, we introduce the function $\hat{\mu}_b^i(\kappa)$ such that the measure of buyers with switching rates in $[\kappa, \kappa + d\kappa]$ is $\hat{\mu}_b^i(\kappa)d\kappa$. We similarly describe the distribution of switching rates within the population of inactive owners in market $i$ by the function $\hat{\mu}_o^i(\kappa)$. These functions satisfy the accounting identities

\[
\int_\kappa^\bar\kappa \hat{\mu}_b^i(\kappa)d\kappa = \mu_b^i \tag{1}
\]

and

\[
\int_\kappa^\bar\kappa \hat{\mu}_o^i(\kappa)d\kappa = \mu_o^i. \tag{2}
\]

To determine $\hat{\mu}_b^i(\kappa)$, we consider the flows in and out of the population of buyers with switching rates in $[\kappa, \kappa + d\kappa]$. The inflow is $\hat{f}(\kappa)\nu^i(\kappa)d\kappa$, coming from the outside investors. The outflow consists of those buyers whose valuation switches to low and who exit the
economy \((\kappa \hat{\mu}_b^i(\kappa)d\kappa)\), and of those who meet with sellers and trade \((\lambda \hat{\mu}_b^i(\kappa)\mu_s^i d\kappa)\). (We are implicitly assuming that all buyer-seller matches result in a trade, a result that we show in Proposition 1.) Since in steady state inflow equals outflow, it follows that

\[
\hat{\mu}_b^i(\kappa) = \frac{\hat{f}(\kappa)\nu^i(\kappa)}{\kappa + \lambda \mu_s^i}.
\]  

(3)

To determine \(\hat{\mu}_o^i(\kappa)\), we similarly consider the flows in and out of the population of inactive owners with switching rates in \([\kappa, \kappa + d\kappa]\). The inflow is \(\lambda \hat{\mu}_b^i(\kappa)\mu_o^i d\kappa\), coming from the buyers who meet with sellers, and the outflow is \(\kappa \hat{\mu}_o^i(\kappa)d\kappa\), coming from the inactive owners whose valuation switches to low and who become sellers. Writing that inflow equals outflow, and using equation (3), we find

\[
\hat{\mu}_o^i(\kappa) = \frac{\lambda \hat{\mu}_b^i \hat{f}(\kappa)\nu^i(\kappa)}{\kappa(\kappa + \lambda \mu_s^i)}.
\]  

(4)

Market equilibrium requires that the measure of asset owners in each market is equal to the asset supply. Since asset owners are either inactive owners or sellers, we have

\[
\mu_o^i + \mu_s^i = S.
\]  

(5)

Combining equations (2), (4), and (5), we find

\[
\int_{\kappa}^{\kappa+d\kappa} \frac{\lambda \mu_o^i \hat{f}(\kappa)\nu^i(\kappa)}{\kappa(\kappa + \lambda \mu_s^i)} d\kappa + \mu_s^i = S.
\]  

(6)

Equation (6) determines \(\mu_s^i\). Equations (1) and (3) then determine \(\mu_b^i\), and equations (2) and (4) determine \(\mu_o^i\).

3.2 Expected Utilities and Prices

We denote by \(v_b^i(\kappa)\) and \(v_o^i(\kappa)\), respectively, the expected utilities of a buyer and an inactive owner with switching rate \(\kappa\) in market \(i\). We also denote by \(v_s^i\) the expected utility of a seller,
and by $p^i(\kappa)$ the expected price when a buyer with switching rate $\kappa$ meets a seller. (The actual price is stochastic, depending on which party makes the take-it-or-leave-it offer.)

To determine $v^i_b(\kappa)$, we note that in a small time interval $[t, t + dt]$, a buyer can either switch to low valuation and exit the economy (probability $\kappa dt$, utility 0), or meet a seller and trade (probability $\lambda \mu^i_s dt$, utility $v^i_o(\kappa) - p^i(\kappa)$), or remain a buyer (utility $v^i_b(\kappa)$). The buyer’s expected utility at time $t$ is the expectation of the above utilities, discounted at the rate $r$:

$$v^i_b(\kappa) = (1 - rdt) \left[ \kappa dt 0 + \lambda \mu^i_s dt (v^i_o(\kappa) - p^i(\kappa)) + (1 - \lambda \mu^i_s dt - \kappa dt) v^i_b(\kappa) \right]. \quad (7)$$

Rearranging, we find that $v^i_b(\kappa)$ is given by

$$rv^i_b(\kappa) = -\kappa v^i_b(\kappa) + \lambda \mu^i_s (v^i_o(\kappa) - p^i(\kappa) - v^i_b(\kappa)). \quad (8)$$

The term $rv^i_b(\kappa)$ can be interpreted as the flow utility of being a buyer. According to equation (8), this flow utility is equal to the expected flow cost of switching to low valuation and exiting the economy, plus the expected flow benefit of meeting a seller and trading.

Proceeding similarly, we find that $v^i_o(\kappa)$ and $v^i_s$ are given by

$$rv^i_o(\kappa) = \delta + \kappa (v^i_s - v^i_o(\kappa)), \quad (9)$$

and

$$rv^i_s = \delta - x + \lambda \mu^i_b (E^i_b(p^i(\kappa)) - v^i_s), \quad (10)$$

respectively, where $E^i_b$ denotes expectation under the probability distribution of $\kappa$ in the population of buyers in market $i$. According to equation (9), the flow utility of being an inactive owner is equal to the dividend flow from owning the asset, plus the expected flow cost of switching to a low valuation and becoming a seller. Likewise, the flow utility of being a seller is equal to the seller’s valuation of the dividend flow, plus the expected flow benefit of meeting a buyer and trading.

The price $p^i(\kappa)$ is the expectation of the buyer’s and the seller’s take-it-or-leave-it offers. The buyer is selected to make the offer with probability $z/(1 + z)$, and offers the seller’s
reservation value, \( v_s^i \). The seller is selected with probability \( 1/(1 + z) \), and offers the buyer’s reservation value, \( v_o(\kappa) - v_b(\kappa) \). Therefore,

\[
p_i^i(\kappa) = \frac{z}{1 + z} v_s^i + \frac{1}{1 + z} (v_o^i(\kappa) - v_b^i(\kappa)).
\]

(11)

**Proposition 1** Equations (8)-(11) have a unique solution for \((v_o^i(\kappa), v_b^i(\kappa), v_s^i, p_i^i(\kappa))\). This solution satisfies, in particular, \( v_o^i(\kappa) - v_b^i(\kappa) - v_s^i > 0 \) for all \( \kappa \).

Since \( v_o^i(\kappa) - v_b^i(\kappa) - v_s^i > 0 \) for all \( \kappa \), any buyer’s reservation value exceeds a seller’s. Thus, all buyer-seller matches result in a trade, a result that we have implicitly assumed so far. The intuition is simply that any buyer is a more efficient asset holder than a seller: the buyer values the dividend flow more highly than the seller, and upon switching to low valuation, faces the same rate of meeting new buyers as the seller.

### 4 Equilibrium

In this section, we endogenize investors’ entry decisions, and determine the set of market equilibria. An investor will enter into the market where the expected utility of being a buyer is highest. Thus, the fraction \( \nu^1(\kappa) \) of investors with switching rate \( \kappa \) who enter into market 1 is given by

\[
\nu^1(\kappa) = 1 \quad \text{if} \quad v_b^1(\kappa) > v_b^2(\kappa)
\]

(12)

\[
0 \leq \nu^1(\kappa) \leq 1 \quad \text{if} \quad v_b^1(\kappa) = v_b^2(\kappa)
\]

(13)

\[
\nu^1(\kappa) = 0 \quad \text{if} \quad v_b^1(\kappa) < v_b^2(\kappa).
\]

(14)

**Definition 1** A market equilibrium consists of fractions \( \{\nu^i(\kappa)\}_{i=1,2} \) of investors entering in each market, measures \( \{\mu_b^i, \mu_o^i, \mu_s^i\}_{i=1,2} \) of each group of investors, and expected utilities and prices \( \{(v_b^i(\kappa), v_o^i(\kappa), v_s^i, p_i^i(\kappa))\}_{i=1,2} \), such that

(a) \( \mu_b^i, \mu_o^i, \) and \( \mu_s^i \), are given by equations (1)-(4) and (6).
(b) \( v^i_b(\kappa), v^i_o(\kappa), v^i_s, \) and \( p^i(\kappa), \) are given by equations (8)-(11).

(c) \( \nu^1(\kappa) \) is given by equations (12)-(14), and \( \nu^2(\kappa) = 1 - \nu^1(\kappa). \)

To determine the set of market equilibria, we establish a sorting condition. We consider an investor who is indifferent between the two markets, i.e., a \( \kappa^* \) such that \( v^1_b(\kappa^*) = v^2_b(\kappa^*), \) and examine which market the investors with different switching rates will prefer.

**Lemma 1** Suppose that \( v^1_b(\kappa^*) = v^2_b(\kappa^*). \) Then, \( v^1_b(\kappa) - v^2_b(\kappa) \) has the same sign as \( (\mu^1_s - \mu^2_s)(\kappa - \kappa^*). \)

According to Lemma 1, the measure of sellers serves as a sorting device across the two markets. If, for example, market 1 has the most sellers, then investors with high switching rates will have a stronger preference for that market than investors with low switching rates. The intuition is that high-switching-rate investors have a stronger preference for lower search times, and in a market with more sellers, buyers’ search times are lower.

Lemma 1 sharply restricts the set of possible equilibria. Equilibria can take one of two forms. First, one market can have more sellers than the other, in which case it attracts the investors with high switching rates. We refer to such equilibria as clientele equilibria, to emphasize that each market attracts a different clientele of investors. Second, both markets can have the same measure of sellers, in which case all investors are indifferent between the two markets. We refer to such equilibria as symmetric equilibria, to emphasize that markets are symmetric from the viewpoint of all investors.

### 4.1 Clientele Equilibria

We focus on the case where market 1 is the one with the most sellers. This is without loss of generality, as any equilibrium obtained in this case has a symmetric counterpart, obtained by switching the indices of the two markets.

**Proposition 2** There exists a unique clientele equilibrium in which market 1 is the one with the most sellers.
A clientele equilibrium is characterized by the switching rate \( \kappa^* \) of the investor who is indifferent between the two markets. Investors with \( \kappa > \kappa^* \) enter into market 1, and investors with \( \kappa < \kappa^* \) enter into market 2. According to Proposition 2, such a cutoff \( \kappa^* \) exists and is unique.

**Proposition 3** The clientele equilibrium where market 1 is the one with the most sellers, has the following properties:

(a) More buyers and sellers in market 1: \( \mu^1_b > \mu^2_b \) and \( \mu^1_s > \mu^2_s \).

(b) Higher buyer-seller ratio in market 1: \( \mu^1_b/\mu^1_s > \mu^2_b/\mu^2_s \).

(c) Higher prices in market 1: \( p^1(\kappa) > p^2(\kappa) \) for all \( \kappa \).

According to Proposition 3, market 1 has not only more sellers than market 2, but also more buyers, and a higher buyer-seller ratio. Moreover, the price that any given buyer expects to pay is higher in market 1. The intuition is as follows. Since there are more sellers in market 1, buyers’ search times are lower. Therefore, holding all else constant, buyers prefer entering into market 1. To restore equilibrium, prices in market 1 must be higher than in market 2. This is accomplished by a higher buying pressure in market 1, i.e., a higher buyer-seller ratio.

In the resulting equilibrium, there is a clientele effect. Investors with high switching rates, who have a stronger preference for lower search times, prefer market 1 despite the higher prices. On the other hand, low-switching-rate investors, who are more patient, value more the lower prices in market 2. The clientele effect is, in turn, what accounts for the greater measure of sellers in market 1, since the high-switching-rate buyers turn faster into sellers.

Our model of search provides a natural measure of liquidity. Since investors cannot trade immediately, but must search for counterparties, they incur a transaction cost of delay. A

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12 The result that the price any given buyer expects to pay is higher in market 1 (i.e., \( p^1(\kappa) > p^2(\kappa) \) for all \( \kappa \)), does not imply that the price paid by the average buyer is higher in that market (i.e., \( E_b^1(p^1(\kappa)) > E_b^2(p^2(\kappa)) \)), because the buyer populations in the two markets are different. A sufficient condition for the latter is that the discount rate \( r \) is small relative to the switching rates and the rates of meeting counterparties.
measure of this transaction cost is the expected time it takes to find a counterparty, and conversely, a measure of liquidity is the inverse of this expected time. Since a buyer in market $i$ meets sellers at the rate $\lambda \mu^i_b$, the expected time it takes to meet a seller is $\tau^i_b \equiv 1/(\lambda \mu^i_b)$. Likewise, the expected time it takes for a seller to meet a buyer is $\tau^i_s \equiv 1/(\lambda \mu^i_s)$. Since the measures of buyers and sellers are higher in market 1 than in market 2, the expected times $\tau^i_b$ and $\tau^i_s$ are lower in market 1, and thus market 1 is more liquid.

An additional market characteristic that is sometimes used as a measure of liquidity, is trading volume. In our model, trading volume is equal to the flow at which matches occur, and is $\lambda^i_b \mu^i_s$ for market $i$. Since the measures of buyers and sellers are higher in market 1 than in market 2, trading volume is higher in market 1, and thus market 1 is more liquid according to the trading-volume measure as well.

Since market 1 is more liquid than market 2, the price difference between the two markets can be interpreted as a liquidity premium: buyers are willing to pay a higher price for asset 1 because it has higher liquidity. In generating a liquidity premium, our model is analogous to the literature on asset pricing with transaction costs. (See Footnote 7 for references.) The clientele effect that our model generates (short-horizon investors have a stronger preference for liquid assets) is also as in that literature. The main difference with the transaction costs literature is that transaction costs in our model are endogenous, i.e., the difference in liquidity between assets 1 and 2 is not due to any exogenous difference in transaction costs.

The liquidity premium is determined by the condition that the buyer $\kappa^*$ is indifferent between the two markets, trading off the higher prices in market 1 with the lower search times. Buyers' search times in a given market are, in turn, determined by the measure of sellers in that market. This measure can be interpreted as an asset’s free float, since it is equal to the quantity of the asset which is available for sale. In a model with homogeneous investors, Weill (2003) derives an affine relationship between an asset’s liquidity premium and the inverse of its free float. Such a relationship can also be derived in our model.\footnote{\footnote{Using equations (8), (9), (11), and $v^1_b(\kappa^*) = v^2_b(\kappa^*)$, we can show that $p^i(\kappa^*) = A - B/\mu_i^s$, for two constants $A$ and $B > 0$ that do not depend on $i$.}} We further illustrate the effect of free float on the liquidity premium in the context of an example in Section 4.3.
4.2 Symmetric Equilibria

In a symmetric equilibrium, the measure of sellers is the same across the two markets. For investors to be indifferent between markets, the prices must also be the same. These requirements, however, do not determine a unique symmetric equilibrium.

**Proposition 4** There exist a continuum of symmetric equilibria. In any such equilibrium, \( p^1(\kappa) = p^2(\kappa) \) for all \( \kappa \).

The intuition for the indeterminacy is that there are infinitely many ways to allocate investors in the two markets so that the measure of sellers, and an index of buying pressure (which determines prices), are the same across markets. One trivial example is that for any switching rate, half of the investors go to each market, i.e., \( \nu^i(\kappa) = 1/2 \) for all \( \kappa \).

4.3 An Example

To illustrate our results, we consider a simple example. We assume that switching rates can only take two values, \( \kappa \) and \( \bar{\kappa} \).\(^{14}\) We set \( \delta = 1 \), \( x = 0.3 \) (low-valuation investors enjoy 70% of the dividend flow), \( r = 0.05 \), \( S = 8 \), \( \kappa = 0.2 \) and \( \bar{\kappa} = 0.5 \) (expected times of valuation switch are five and two years, respectively), \( f(\kappa) = 2 \) and \( f(\bar{\kappa}) = 3 \) (measure of \( \kappa \)-investors in the economy is \( f(\kappa)/\kappa = 10 \), and measure of \( \bar{\kappa} \)-investors is \( f(\bar{\kappa})/\bar{\kappa} = 6 \); the sum of the two measures, which is the total asset demand is equal to the total asset supply, \( 2S \), \( \lambda = 100 \), and \( z = 1 \).

In the clientele equilibrium, all the \( \bar{\kappa} \)-investors enter into market 1, as well as 20% of the \( \kappa \)-investors. The measure of sellers in market 1 is \( \mu^1_s = 0.181 \) and in market 2 is \( \mu^2_s = 0.127 \). The corresponding measures of buyers are \( \mu^1_b = 0.183 \) and \( \mu^2_b = 0.124 \), and the buyer-seller ratios are 1.015 and 0.978, respectively. The price in market 2 is \( p^2(\bar{\kappa}) = 16.921 \). The prices paid by the two types of buyers in market 1 are approximately equal: \( p^1(\kappa) \approx p^1(\bar{\kappa}) = 16.947 \).

\(^{14}\)We consider a discrete distribution, rather than a continuous one as in the rest of the paper, in order to perform the simple comparative statics exercise in the end of this section.
Thus, consistent with our results, market 1 has more sellers, more buyers, a higher buyer-seller ratio, and higher prices.

Using this example, we can investigate how changes in investors’ horizons affect asset prices. Suppose, for example, that the $\kappa$-investors become more patient, and their switching rate decreases to 0.1. Suppose also that $f(\kappa)$ decreases to 1, so that the measure of $\kappa$-investors in the economy stays fixed. This change decreases substantially the measure of sellers in market 2 (where most of the $\kappa$-investors enter) to $\mu^2_s = 0.091$, and has a smaller impact on the measure of sellers in market 1, decreasing it to $\mu^1_s = 0.175$. Because of the substantial decrease in the free float of asset 2, its price decreases to $p^2(\kappa) = 16.913$. This result is consistent with the intuition that when trading volume in a bond decreases (perhaps because investors with longer horizons start investing in the bond), the bond’s liquidity decreases, and so does its price.

5 Welfare Analysis

In this section, we perform a welfare analysis of the allocation of liquidity across assets. We examine, in particular, whether it is socially desirable that liquidity is concentrated in one asset, possibly at the expense of others. In the context of our model, this amounts to comparing the clientele equilibrium, where such concentration of liquidity occurs, to the symmetric equilibria. Prior to performing this comparison, we examine the social optimality of investors’ entry decisions in the clientele equilibrium. This gives some insights on the welfare properties of the clientele equilibrium, and is a useful first step for comparing this equilibrium to the symmetric ones.

We use a simple welfare criterion which gives the utilities of all investors present in the market equal weight, and discounts those of the future entrants at the common discount rate $r$. This discounting is consistent with equal weighting, since future entrants can be viewed as outside investors, whose utility is the discounted value of entering the market. Our welfare criterion thus is

$$\mathcal{W} = \sum_{i=1,2} \left[ \int_\kappa^\infty \left[ v^i_b(\kappa)\hat{\mu}^i_b(\kappa) + v^i_o(\kappa)\hat{\mu}^i_o(\kappa) \right] d\kappa + v^i_s\mu^i_s + \frac{1}{r} \int_\kappa^\infty v^i_b(\kappa)\hat{f}(\kappa)\nu^i(\kappa) d\kappa \right],$$
where the last term reflects the welfare of the stream of future entrants. In Lemma 2, we show that welfare takes a simple and intuitive form.

**Lemma 2**

\[
W = \frac{2\delta}{r} S - \frac{x}{r} (\mu_1^1 + \mu_2^2). \tag{15}
\]

The first term in equation (15) is the present value of the dividends paid by the two assets. Welfare would coincide with this present value if all asset owners enjoyed the full value \(\delta\) of the dividends. Some owners, however, enjoy only the value \(\delta - x\). These are the sellers in the two markets, and welfare needs to be adjusted downwards by their total measure.

### 5.1 Entry in the Clientele Equilibrium

We begin our welfare analysis with the entry decisions of investors in the clientele equilibrium. These decisions are characterized by a cutoff \(\kappa^*\) such that investors above \(\kappa^*\) enter into market 1 and investors below \(\kappa^*\) into market 2. To examine whether investors’ private decisions are socially optimal, we consider the change in welfare if some investors close to \(\kappa^*\) enter into a different market than the one prescribed in equilibrium. More specifically, we assume that at time 0, some buyers with switching rates in \([\kappa, \kappa + d\kappa]\) in market \(i\) are reallocated from market 1 to market 2 (but from then on entry decisions are according to the cutoff \(\kappa^*\)). This reallocation causes the markets to be temporarily out of steady state, and to converge over time to the original steady state.

To compute the change in welfare, we need to evaluate welfare out of steady state. We first consider the non-steady state that results when the measure of buyers with switching rates in \([\kappa, \kappa + d\kappa]\) in market \(i\), is increased by \(\epsilon\), relative to the steady state. Denoting welfare in this non-steady state by \(W(\epsilon)\), we set

\[
V^i_b(\kappa) \equiv \frac{dW(\epsilon)}{d\epsilon} \bigg|_{\epsilon=0}.
\]

The variable \(V^i_b(\kappa)\) measures the increase in social welfare by adding buyers with switching rate \(\kappa\) in market \(i\). It thus represents the social value of these buyers. Proceeding similarly,
we can define the social value $V_o^i(\kappa)$ of owners with switching rate $\kappa$, and the social value $V_s^i$ of sellers.

**Proposition 5** The social values $V_b^i(\kappa)$, $V_o^i(\kappa)$, and $V_s^i$, are given by

\begin{align}
rV_b^i(\kappa) &= -\kappa V_b^i(\kappa) + \lambda \mu_s^i (V_o^i(\kappa) - V_b^i(\kappa) - V_s^i), \\
rV_o^i(\kappa) &= \delta + \kappa (V_s^i - V_o^i(\kappa)), \\
rV_s^i &= \delta - x + \lambda \mu_b^i (E_b^i(V_o^i(\kappa) - V_b^i(\kappa)) - V_s^i).
\end{align}

Equations (16)-(18) are analogous to equations (8)-(10) that determine investors’ expected utilities. To compare the two sets of equations, we reproduce equations (8)-(10) below, using equation (11) to eliminate the price:

\begin{align}
rV_b^i(\kappa) &= -\kappa v_b^i(\kappa) + \lambda \mu_s^i z (v_o^i(\kappa) - v_b^i(\kappa) - v_s^i), \\
rV_o^i(\kappa) &= \delta + \kappa (v_s^i - v_o^i(\kappa)), \\
rV_s^i &= \delta - x + \lambda \mu_b^i \frac{1}{1 + z} (E_b^i(v_o^i(\kappa) - v_b^i(\kappa)) - v_s^i).
\end{align}

The key difference between expected utilities and social values concerns the flow benefit of meeting a counterparty. Consider, for example, the flow benefit associated to a buyer. In computing the buyer’s expected utility, we multiply the buyer’s rate of meeting a seller, $\lambda \mu_s^i$, times the surplus realized by the buyer-seller pair, $v_o^i(\kappa) - v_b^i(\kappa) - v_s^i$, times the fraction of that surplus that the buyer appropriates, $z/(1 + z)$. In computing the buyer’s social value, however, we need to attribute the full surplus to the buyer. This is because the social value measures an investor’s marginal contribution to social welfare. Since a trade involving a specific buyer is realized only because that buyer is added into the market, the buyer’s marginal contribution is the full surplus associated to the trade. (The same is obviously true for the seller involved in the trade.)

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\textsuperscript{15} Additionally, in computing the buyer’s social value, we need to consider not the buyer’s rate of meeting a seller, but the marginal increase in the rate of buyer-seller meetings achieved by adding the buyer in the market. The two coincide, however, because the search technology is linear in the measures of buyers and sellers.

\textsuperscript{16} It is worth explaining why our search model generates discrepancies between expected utilities and social values.
Proposition 6  In the clientele equilibrium where market 1 is the one with the most sellers, the social value of the buyer $\kappa^*$ is higher in market 2, i.e., $V_b^1(\kappa^*) < V_b^2(\kappa^*)$.

Since the social value of the buyer $\kappa^*$ is higher in market 2, welfare can be improved by reallocating some buyers close to $\kappa^*$ from market 1 to market 2. Thus, in the clientele equilibrium, there is excessive entry into market 1, i.e., the more liquid market. The intuition is as follows. Since the buyer $\kappa^*$ is indifferent between the two markets, the buyer’s flow benefit of meeting a seller is the same across markets. A seller’s flow benefit of meeting a buyer, however, is higher in market 1. This is because the seller’s rate of meeting a buyer involves the measure of buyers rather than that of sellers, and the buyer-seller ratio is higher in market 1. Since a seller’s flow benefit is higher in market 1, the discrepancy between the seller’s social value and expected utility is larger in that market. (Recall that social value attributes the full benefit of a meeting to each party, while expected utility attributes only a fraction.) Conversely, since buyers bargain on the basis of a seller’s expected utility rather than social value, the discrepancy between their own social value and expected utility is smaller in market 1. Given that for the indifferent buyer, expected utility is the same across the two markets, social value is greater in market 2. Intuitively, sellers are more socially valuable in market 1 because they are in relatively short supply in that market. Buyers internalize this through the higher prices, but only partially, and thus they enter excessively into market 1.

While Proposition 6 implies that there is excessive entry into the more liquid market, it does not imply that the concentration of liquidity in that market is excessive. Excessive entry into market 1 implies that the ratio of buyers $\mu_b^1 / \mu_b^2$ is too high. Thus, when liquidity is measured from a seller’s viewpoint, the concentration of liquidity in market 1 is indeed excessive.\footnote{Recall that liquidity is measured by the inverse of the expected time it takes to find a counterparty. When the expected time is from a seller’s viewpoint, the relative liquidity of the two markets is $(1/\tau_s^1)/(1/\tau_s^2) = \mu_b^1 / \mu_b^2$, i.e., equal to the ratio of buyers in the two markets.} At the same time, having too many buyers in one market, reduces the number of sellers. Thus, the ratio of sellers $\mu_s^1 / \mu_s^2$ is too low, which implies that when liquidity is measured from a buyer’s viewpoint, the concentration of liquidity in market 1 is not high values, while the standard Walrasian model does not. In the Walrasian model, the surplus that a buyer-seller pair bargain over is zero, since either party can leave the pair and obtain immediately the market price from another counterparty. In the search model, by contrast, the surplus is non-zero, since finding another counterparty is costly. It is because each party gets only a fraction of this non-zero surplus that discrepancies between expected utilities and social values arise.\footnote{Recall that liquidity is measured by the inverse of the expected time it takes to find a counterparty. When the expected time is from a seller’s viewpoint, the relative liquidity of the two markets is $(1/\tau_s^1)/(1/\tau_s^2) = \mu_b^1 / \mu_b^2$, i.e., equal to the ratio of buyers in the two markets.}
enough. We next examine whether the concentration of liquidity is desirable in the first place, by comparing the clientele equilibrium to the symmetric ones.

5.2 Clientele vs. Symmetric Equilibria

We start with a methodological observation. Both the clientele and the symmetric equilibria are dynamic steady states, and comparing these can be misleading. Indeed, an action aiming to take the market from an inferior steady state to a superior one, must involve non-steady-state dynamics. For such an action to be evaluated based only on a comparison between steady states, these dynamics must be unimportant relative to the long-run limit. This is the case when the discount rate $r$ is small, which we assume in some of our results below.

Both the clientele and the symmetric equilibria are fully characterized by the decisions of investors as to which market to enter. We next determine, and use as a benchmark, the socially optimal entry decisions in steady state. These are the solution to the problem

$$\max_{\nu^1(\kappa)} W,$$

where $W$ is given by Lemma 2, $\mu^1_1$ by equation (6), and $\nu^2(\kappa) = 1 - \nu^1(\kappa)$. We solve this problem, ($P$), in Proposition 7.

**Proposition 7** The problem ($P$) has two symmetric solutions. The first solution satisfies $\mu^1_1 > \mu^2_1$, $\nu^1(\kappa) = 1$ for $\kappa > \kappa^*_w$, and $\nu^1(\kappa) = 0$ for $\kappa < \kappa^*_w$, for a cutoff $\kappa^*_w$. The second solution is obtained from the first by switching the indices of the two markets.

Proposition 7 implies that it is socially optimal to create two markets with different measures of sellers. This is because the two markets can cater to different clienteles of investors: buyers with switching rates above a cutoff $\kappa^*_w$, who have a greater preference for lower search times, are allocated to the market with the most sellers, while the opposite holds for buyers below $\kappa^*_w$.

The cutoff $\kappa^*_w$ determines the heterogeneity of the two markets. Increasing $\kappa^*_w$, reduces the entry into the more liquid market, say market 1. This increases the ratio of sellers $\mu^1_1/\mu^2_1$, and makes the markets more heterogeneous from a buyer’s viewpoint.
We next treat the cutoff above which buyers enter into market 1 as a free variable, and denote it by \( \hat{\kappa} \). Social welfare is maximized for \( \hat{\kappa} = \kappa^*_w \). As \( \hat{\kappa} \) decreases below \( \kappa^*_w \), the two markets become more homogenous from a buyer’s viewpoint, and welfare decreases. Consider now two values of \( \hat{\kappa} \): the cutoff \( \kappa^* \) corresponding to the clientele equilibrium, and the cutoff \( \kappa' \) for which the measure of sellers is the same across the two markets. Since in the clientele equilibrium there is excessive entry into market 1, markets are not heterogeneous enough from a buyer’s viewpoint, and thus \( \kappa^* < \kappa^*_w \). At the same time, since there is some heterogeneity, \( \kappa^* > \kappa' \). Therefore, welfare under the clientele equilibrium exceeds that under the allocation corresponding to \( \kappa' \).

Interestingly, welfare under the latter allocation is the same as under any of the symmetric equilibria. To see why, note that both types of allocations have the property that the measure of sellers is the same across the two markets. Consider now an arbitrary allocation with this property, and denote by \( \mu_s \equiv \mu_s^1 = \mu_s^2 \) the common measure of sellers. The aggregate measure of inactive owners (i.e., the sum across both markets) depends on this allocation only through \( \mu_s \), since \( \mu_s \) is the only determinant of the buyers’ matching rate. Since the aggregate measure of inactive owners, plus that of sellers, must equal the aggregate asset supply, \( \mu_s \) is uniquely determined regardless of the specific allocation.\(^{18}\) Since, in addition, welfare depends only on \( \mu_s \), it is also independent of the specific allocation.

Summarizing, we can show the following proposition:

**Proposition 8** All symmetric equilibria achieve the same welfare. Moreover, for small \( r \), they are dominated by the clientele equilibrium.

## 6 Asymmetric Information

In this section, we extend our analysis to the case where buyers’ switching rates are not observable to the sellers. Since switching rates affect buyers’ reservation values (high-

\(^{18}\) To show this formally, we add equation (6) for market 1 to the same equation for market 2, and find

\[
\int_{\underline{\kappa}}^{\overline{\kappa}} \frac{\lambda \mu_s \hat{f}(\kappa)}{\kappa} d\kappa + 2\mu_s = 2S.
\]

This equation determines \( \mu_s \) uniquely, regardless of the specific allocation.
switching-rate buyers have to re-enter the search market as sellers sooner, and thus have lower reservation values), the bargaining game between a buyer and a seller involves asymmetric information.

We begin our analysis by examining whether a clientele equilibrium exists. Such an equilibrium is characterized by the cutoff $\kappa^*$ of the indifferent investor. Without loss of generality, we assume that investors above the cutoff enter into market 1. We denote by $\kappa^i$ the maximum switching rate of an investor in market $i$, i.e., $\kappa^1 = \pi$ and $\kappa^2 = \kappa^*$. Since reservation values decrease in switching rates, the buyer with switching rate $\kappa^i$ has the lowest reservation value in market $i$.

For simplicity, we restrict the clientele equilibrium to be in pure strategies, i.e., all sellers in a given market make the same offer. In a pure-strategy equilibrium, the sellers’ offer must be accepted by all buyers entering a market. Indeed, suppose that the buyers with switching rates above a cutoff $\hat{\kappa}^i < \kappa^i$ reject the sellers’ offer in market $i$. Then, the density function $\mu_b^i(\kappa)$ of buyers in market $i$ would increase discontinuously at $\hat{\kappa}^i$, as the buyers above $\hat{\kappa}^i$ would exit the buyer pool at lower rates.\footnote{More specifically, $\mu_b^i(\kappa)$ would be given by equation (3) for $\kappa < \hat{\kappa}^i$, and $\mu_b^i(\kappa) = \hat{f}(\kappa)\nu^i(\kappa)/\kappa$ for $\kappa > \hat{\kappa}^i$, as the buyers above $\hat{\kappa}^i$ would exit the buyer pool only because of a switch to low valuation.} This discontinuity would induce the sellers to slightly lower their offer, as to trade with buyers above $\hat{\kappa}^i$.

Since all buyer-seller matches result in a trade, the equations for the measures of buyers, inactive owners, and sellers in each market are as in the symmetric information case. The equations for the expected utilities and prices are, however, somewhat different, because the price is now the same for all buyers entering a market. More specifically, the sellers’ offer in market $i$ is $v^i_s(\kappa^i) - v^i_b(\kappa^i)$, i.e., the reservation value of the highest-switching-rate buyer, and the buyers’ offer is $v^i_b$, i.e., the reservation value of a seller. Since buyers are selected to make the offer with probability $z/(1+z)$, and sellers with probability $1/(1+z)$, the expected price in market $i$ is

$$p^i = \frac{z}{1+z} v^i_s + \frac{1}{1+z} (v^i_s(\kappa^i) - v^i_b(\kappa^i)). \tag{22}$$

The expected utility of a buyer in market $i$ is given by

$$rv^i_b(\kappa) = -\kappa v^i_b(\kappa) + \lambda \mu^i_s(v^i_b(\kappa) - p^i - v^i_b(\kappa)), \tag{23}$$
the expected utility of a seller is given by

\[ rv^i_s = \delta - x + \lambda \mu^i_b (p^i - v^i_s), \tag{24} \]

and the expected utility of an inactive owner is given by equation (9) as in the symmetric information case.

For a clientele equilibrium to exist, each seller must find it optimal to make an offer which is accepted by all buyers. Suppose that upon meeting a buyer, a seller decides to make an offer which is accepted only when the buyer’s switching rate is up to \( \kappa \). Then, the offer is \( v^i_o(\kappa) - v^i_b(\kappa) \), and if it is rejected the seller re-enters the search process with expected utility \( v^i_s \). Thus, the seller finds it optimal to trade with all buyers if

\[ \kappa^i \in \arg\max_{\kappa} \left[ P^i_b(\kappa)(v^i_o(\kappa) - v^i_b(\kappa)) + (1 - P^i_b(\kappa))v^i_s \right], \tag{25} \]

where \( P^i_b(\kappa) \) denotes the probability that a buyer in market \( i \) has switching rate up to \( \kappa \).

Additionally, in a clientele equilibrium, the buyer \( \kappa^* \) must be indifferent between the two markets. In the asymmetric information case, an indifferent buyer might not exist. Indeed, suppose that the seller has all the bargaining power \( (z = 0) \). Then, the buyer \( \kappa^* \) receives zero surplus in market 2 (because the price is equal to his reservation value), but a positive surplus in market 1. To formulate a sufficient condition for the existence of an indifferent buyer, we treat the cutoff above which investors enter into market 1 as a free variable, and consider population measures and expected utilities as functions of that variable. We also consider the value \( \kappa' \) of the cutoff for which the measures of sellers are equal in the two markets. Then, the sufficient condition is that when the cutoff takes the value \( \kappa' \), the buyer \( \kappa' \) prefers entering into market 2. We refer to this condition as Condition (C).

**Proposition 9** If Conditions (25) and (C) hold, a clientele equilibrium exists and has the following properties:

(a) More buyers and sellers in market 1: \( \mu^1_b > \mu^2_b \) and \( \mu^1_s > \mu^2_s \).

(b) Higher buyer-seller ratio in market 1: \( \mu^1_b / \mu^1_s > \mu^2_b / \mu^2_s \).
(c) Higher prices in market 1: \( p^1 > p^2 \).

According to Proposition 9, the conditions which ensure the existence of a clientele equilibrium also ensure that this equilibrium has the same properties as in the symmetric information case. In particular, the market with the high-switching-rate investors has more sellers, more buyers, a higher buyer-seller ratio, and higher prices.\(^{20}\)

Conditions (25) and (C) hold in the natural case where the rates of meeting counterparties are high relative to the switching rates and the discount rate. (In other words, the search times are small relative to the times of valuation switch and the inverse of the discount rate.) One way to obtain this case is to assume that asset supply and demand are large, so that the measures of buyers and sellers are large. In particular, we assume that the supply \( S \) of each asset grows large, and the flow of investors into the economy is \( \hat{f}(\kappa) = S\hat{F}(\kappa) \), where \( \hat{F}(\kappa) \) is held fixed. We further assume that

\[
\int_{\kappa}^{\pi} \frac{\hat{F}(\kappa)}{\kappa} d\kappa = 2, \tag{26}
\]

a condition ensuring that asset supply and demand grow at the same rate.\(^{21}\)

**Proposition 10** Suppose that \( z \in (0, \infty) \), and \( \hat{f}(\kappa) = S\hat{F}(\kappa) \) for \( \hat{F}(\kappa) \) satisfying Condition (26). Then, for \( S \) large enough, Conditions (25) and (C) hold.

Having established the existence of a clientele equilibrium, we next examine its welfare properties. As shown in Section 5, a sufficient condition for the clientele equilibrium to dominate the symmetric ones is that entry into market 1 is at or above the socially optimal level. To examine whether this condition holds in the asymmetric information case, we compare entry decisions with the symmetric information case. Under asymmetric information, the buyer

\(^{20}\)In fact, some properties of a clientele equilibrium can be proven more generally, without using the sufficient conditions for existence. These are that the market with the high-switching-rate investors has more buyers and higher trading volume, and has a higher buyer-seller ratio and higher prices if it has more sellers.

\(^{21}\)The two assets are in total supply \( 2S \). The total demand is the measure of high-valuation investors, i.e., buyers and inactive owners, across the two markets. From equations (1)-(4), this is \( \int_{\kappa}^{\pi} \frac{f(\kappa)}{\kappa} d\kappa \).
\( \kappa^* \) receives a positive surplus from the seller’s offer when entering into market 1, because the same offer must also be accepted by the buyer \( \overline{\kappa} \). This induces more entry into market 1. At the same time, a seller’s outside option is reduced by his inability to price-discriminate, and this lowers the offer a buyer can make, thus raising the buyer’s utility. Whether this induces more or less entry into market 1 depends on the relative heterogeneity of investors in the two markets. When, for example, \( \kappa^* \) is close to \( \overline{\kappa} \), market 1 is more homogeneous. Thus, the inability to price-discriminate hurts more the sellers in market 2, inducing more entry into that market. The overall effect is ambiguous. Suppose, for example, that \( \tilde{F}(\kappa) = c\kappa^\alpha \), where \( \alpha \in \mathbb{R} \) measures the tilt of the distribution towards high switching rates, \( c \) is a normalizing constant (so that equation (26) holds), and \( \overline{\kappa}/\underline{\kappa} = 2 \). Then, entry into market 1 is greater in the asymmetric information case, as long as \( \alpha \) is smaller than 0.51.

Even when entry into market 1 is lower in the asymmetric information case, it can still be socially excessive, because it is so under symmetric information. For example, when \( \tilde{F}(\kappa) = c\kappa^\alpha \), entry into market 1 is socially excessive for all values of \( \alpha \) and \( \overline{\kappa}/\underline{\kappa} \).

7 Conclusion

We develop an asset-market model in which assets with identical payoffs differ in their liquidity. Our theory of liquidity is based on search: investors locate counterparties through search, and an asset’s liquidity is related to the ease of locating a counterparty. We argue that search is a realistic friction in many asset markets, and one that has intuitive implications, linking, for example, an asset’s liquidity to the asset’s free float.

We consider an economy with two identical assets, and a continuous inflow and outflow of investors. Investors entering the economy seek to buy one of the two assets, and are facing the constraint that they cannot search simultaneously in both markets. Upon buying an asset, investors become inactive asset owners, and they next turn into sellers when their valuation for the asset switches to a lower value. Switching rates differ across investors, implying different investment horizons.

We show that there exists an equilibrium where one market has more buyers and sellers,\footnote{There might, perhaps, be counterexamples for more complicated distributions.}
lower search times, higher trading volume, higher prices, and short-horizon investors. Thus, our model generates endogenous differences in liquidity across identical assets, and it also generates liquidity premia and clientele effects. Our analysis can shed light on the on-the-run phenomenon in the US Treasury market, by providing one set of assumptions under which this phenomenon can arise. Modelling liquidity through search also generates empirical predictions which are unique to our model. One prediction is that the ratio of sellers’ search times to those of buyers should be higher in more liquid markets.

Coming to the welfare analysis, we show that the asymmetric equilibrium dominates the symmetric ones where the two markets are identical. At the same time, in the asymmetric equilibrium there is excessive entry into the more liquid market, implying that the two markets are not heterogeneous enough from the buyers’ point of view. Our analysis suggests that the concentration of liquidity in the on-the-run bond is a desirable outcome. Of course, measures aimed at integrating the on- and off-the-run markets could lead to further increases in welfare.\textsuperscript{23}

\textsuperscript{23}Bennett, Garbade, and Kambhu (2000) describe such measures. They argue, in particular, that issuance dates should be chosen so that bonds with different maturities at issuance can mature on the same date, and can be assigned the same CUSIP number as a result. In the context of our model, making such bonds strictly identical securities would correspond to allowing for simultaneous search in the two markets.
Appendix

Proof of Proposition 1: Plugging equation (11) into (8) and (10), we find

\[ rv_o^i(k) = -\kappa v_b^i(k) + \lambda \mu_s^i \frac{z}{1+z} (v_o^i(k) - v_b^i(k) - v_s^i), \]  

(27)

and

\[ rv_s^i = \delta - x + \lambda \mu_b^i \frac{1}{1+z} \left( E_b^i (v_o^i(k) - v_b^i(k)) - v_s^i \right). \]  

(28)

Subtracting equation (27) from (9), we find

\[ r(v_o^i(k) - v_b^i(k)) = \delta + \kappa (v_s^i - v_o^i(k) + v_b^i(k)) - \lambda \mu_s^i \frac{z}{1+z} (v_o^i(k) - v_b^i(k) - v_s^i) \]

\[ \Rightarrow v_o^i(k) - v_b^i(k) = \frac{\delta + (\kappa + \lambda \mu_s^i \frac{z}{1+z}) v_s^i}{r + \kappa + \lambda \mu_s^i \frac{z}{1+z}}. \]  

(29)

Plugging equation (29) into (28), we find

\[ rv_s^i = \delta - x + \lambda \mu_b^i \frac{1}{1+z} \left( \delta - rv_s^i \right) E_b^i \left[ \frac{1}{r + \kappa + \lambda \mu_s^i \frac{z}{1+z}} \right] \]

\[ \Rightarrow v_s^i = \frac{\delta}{r} - \frac{x}{r} \frac{1}{1 + \lambda \mu_b^i \frac{1}{1+z} E_b^i \left[ \frac{1}{r + \kappa + \lambda \mu_s^i \frac{z}{1+z}} \right]}. \]  

(30)

Given \( v_s^i \), the variables \( v_o^i(k), v_b^i(k), \) and \( p^i(k) \), are uniquely determined from equations (9), (27), and (11), respectively. In the rest of the proof, we compute \( v_b^i(k) \) and \( p^i(k) \), because we use them in our subsequent analysis. Plugging equation (30) into (29), we find

\[ v_o^i(k) - v_b^i(k) = \frac{\delta}{r} - \frac{x}{r} \frac{\kappa + \lambda \mu_s^i \frac{z}{1+z}}{r + \kappa + \lambda \mu_s^i \frac{z}{1+z}} \left[ 1 + \lambda \mu_b^i \frac{1}{1+z} E_b^i \left[ \frac{1}{r + \kappa + \lambda \mu_s^i \frac{z}{1+z}} \right] \right]. \]  

(31)

Subtracting equation (30) from (31), we find

\[ v_o^i(k) - v_b^i(k) - v_s^i = \frac{x}{\left( r + \kappa + \lambda \mu_s^i \frac{z}{1+z} \right) \left[ 1 + \lambda \mu_b^i \frac{1}{1+z} E_b^i \left[ \frac{1}{r + \kappa + \lambda \mu_s^i \frac{z}{1+z}} \right] \right]} > 0. \]  

(32)
Plugging equation (32) into (27), we can compute $v_i^b(\kappa)$:

$$rv_i^b(\kappa) = -\kappa v_i^b(\kappa) + \lambda \mu_1 \frac{z}{1+z} \frac{x}{r+\kappa + \lambda \mu_1 \frac{z}{1+z}} \left[ 1 + \lambda \mu_{1b} \frac{1}{1+z} E_b \frac{1}{r+\kappa + \lambda \mu_1 \frac{z}{1+z}} \right]$$

$$\Rightarrow v_i^b(\kappa) = \frac{\lambda \mu_1 \frac{z}{1+z} x}{(r+\kappa) \left( r+\kappa + \lambda \mu_1 \frac{z}{1+z} \right) \left[ 1 + \lambda \mu_{1b} \frac{1}{1+z} E_b \frac{1}{r+\kappa + \lambda \mu_1 \frac{z}{1+z}} \right]}.$$

(33)

Plugging equations (30) and (31) into (11), we can compute $p_i^b(\kappa)$:

$$p_i^b(\kappa) = \frac{\delta}{r} - \frac{x}{r+\kappa + \lambda \mu_1 \frac{z}{1+z}} \left[ 1 + \lambda \mu_{1b} \frac{1}{1+z} E_b \frac{1}{r+\kappa + \lambda \mu_1 \frac{z}{1+z}} \right].$$

(34)

Proof of Lemma 1: Since $v_i^1(\kappa^*) = v_i^2(\kappa^*) > 0$, the difference $v_i^1(\kappa) - v_i^2(\kappa)$ has the same sign as

$$\frac{v_i^1(\kappa)}{v_i^1(\kappa^*)} - \frac{v_i^2(\kappa)}{v_i^2(\kappa^*)}.$$

Equation (33) implies that

$$\frac{v_i^1(\kappa)}{v_i^1(\kappa^*)} - \frac{v_i^2(\kappa)}{v_i^2(\kappa^*)} = \frac{r+\kappa^*}{r+\kappa} \left[ \frac{r+\kappa^* + \lambda \mu_1 \frac{z}{1+z}}{r+\kappa + \lambda \mu_1 \frac{z}{1+z}} - \frac{r+\kappa + \lambda \mu_2 \frac{z}{1+z}}{r+\kappa + \lambda \mu_2 \frac{z}{1+z}} \right]$$

$$= \frac{r+\kappa^*}{r+\kappa} \frac{\lambda (\mu_1 - \mu_2) \frac{z}{1+z} (\kappa - \kappa^*)}{(r+\kappa + \lambda \mu_1 \frac{z}{1+z}) (r+\kappa + \lambda \mu_2 \frac{z}{1+z})},$$

which proves the lemma.

To prove Proposition 2, we first prove the following lemma:

**Lemma 3** Suppose that investors’ entry decisions are given by $\nu_i^1(\kappa) = 1$ for $\kappa > \kappa^*$, and $\nu_i^1(\kappa) = 0$ for $\kappa < \kappa^*$, for some cutoff $\kappa^*$. Then, $\mu_1$ and $\mu_2$ are uniquely determined, $\mu_1$ is increasing in $\kappa^*$, and $\mu_2$ is decreasing in $\kappa^*$.
Proof: Using equation (6), and setting $i = 1$, $\nu^1(\kappa) = 1$ for $\kappa > \kappa^*$, and $\nu^1(\kappa) = 0$ for $\kappa < \kappa^*$, we find

$$\int_{\kappa^*}^{\kappa} \frac{\lambda \mu^1_s f(\kappa)}{\kappa (\kappa + \lambda \mu^1_s)} d\kappa + \mu^1_s = S. \quad (35)$$

The LHS of this equation is strictly increasing in $\mu^1_s$, is zero for $\mu^1_s = 0$, and is infinite for $\mu^1_s = \infty$. Therefore, equation (35) has a unique solution $\mu^1_s$. Moreover, differentiating implicitly w.r.t. $\kappa^*$, we find

$$\frac{d \mu^1_s}{d \kappa^*} = \frac{\lambda \mu^1_s f(\kappa^*)}{\kappa^* (\kappa^* + \lambda \mu^1_s)} > 0.$$ 

Proceeding similarly, we find that $\mu^2_s$ is uniquely determined by

$$\int_{\kappa^*}^{\kappa} \frac{\lambda \mu^2_s f(\kappa)}{\kappa (\kappa + \lambda \mu^2_s)} d\kappa + \mu^2_s = S. \quad (36)$$

Differentiating implicitly w.r.t. $\kappa^*$, we find

$$\frac{d \mu^2_s}{d \kappa^*} = -\frac{\lambda \mu^2_s f(\kappa^*)}{\kappa^* (\kappa^* + \lambda \mu^2_s)} < 0.$$ 

![Proof of Proposition 2](image)

Proof of Proposition 2: The cutoff $\kappa^*$ is determined by the indifference condition $v^1_b(\kappa^*) = v^2_b(\kappa^*)$. Using equation (33), we can write this condition as

$$\frac{\mu^1_s}{r + \kappa^* + \lambda \mu^1_s \frac{z}{1+z} + \lambda \mu^1_b \frac{1}{1+z} E^1} = \frac{\mu^2_s}{r + \kappa^* + \lambda \mu^2_s \frac{z}{1+z} + \lambda \mu^2_b \frac{1}{1+z} E^2}, \quad (37)$$

where

$$E^i \equiv E^i_b \left[ \frac{r + \kappa^* + \lambda \mu^i_s \frac{z}{1+z}}{r + \kappa + \lambda \mu^i_s \frac{z}{1+z}} \right].$$

Multiplying by the denominators, we find

$$(r + \kappa^*)(\mu^1_s - \mu^2_s) + \lambda \frac{1}{1+z} (\mu^1_s \mu^2_b E^2 - \mu^2_s \mu^1_b E^1) = 0. \quad (38)$$
Since
\[ E^1 = \frac{1}{\mu_b} \int_{\kappa}^{\kappa} \frac{r + \kappa + \lambda \mu_s^{1/1+z}}{r + \kappa + \lambda \mu_s^{1/1+z}} \mu_b^1(\kappa) d\kappa = \frac{1}{\mu_b} \int_{\kappa^*}^{\kappa} \frac{\hat{f}(\kappa) (r + \kappa + \lambda \mu_s^{1/1+z})}{(r + \kappa + \lambda \mu_s^{1/1+z})} d\kappa, \]
and
\[ E^2 = \frac{1}{\mu_b} \int_{\kappa}^{\kappa^*} \frac{\hat{f}(\kappa) (r + \kappa + \lambda \mu_s^{2/1+z})}{(r + \kappa + \lambda \mu_s^{2/1+z})} d\kappa, \]
equation (38) can be written as
\[ \mu_s^1 - \mu_s^2 + \mu_s^1 \frac{1}{r + \kappa^*} \frac{1}{1+z} \int_{\kappa}^{\kappa^*} \frac{\lambda \hat{f}(\kappa) (r + \kappa + \lambda \mu_s^{1/1+z})}{(r + \kappa + \lambda \mu_s^{1/1+z})} d\kappa 
- \mu_s^2 \frac{1}{r + \kappa^*} \frac{1}{1+z} \int_{\kappa^*}^{\kappa} \frac{\lambda \hat{f}(\kappa) (r + \kappa + \lambda \mu_s^{2/1+z})}{(r + \kappa + \lambda \mu_s^{2/1+z})} d\kappa = 0. \] (39)

To prove the proposition, we consider equation (39) as a function of the single unknown \( \kappa^* \), i.e., we assume that \( \mu_s^1 \) and \( \mu_s^2 \) are implicitly defined, given \( \kappa^* \), from Lemma 3. To show that an equilibrium exists, it suffices to show that equation (39) has a solution \( \kappa^* \), for which \( \mu_s^1 > \mu_s^2 \). For \( \kappa^* = \kappa_1 \), the LHS is negative, since equation (36) implies that \( \mu_s^2 = S > \mu_s^1 \). Conversely, for \( \kappa^* = \kappa_2 \), the LHS is positive. Therefore, equation (39) has a solution \( \kappa^* \in (\kappa_1, \kappa_2) \). To show that \( \mu_s^1 > \mu_s^2 \), we first note that
\[ \int_{\kappa^*}^{\kappa_2} \frac{\lambda \hat{f}(\kappa) (r + \kappa + \lambda \mu_s^{1/1+z})}{(r + \kappa + \lambda \mu_s^{1/1+z})} d\kappa 
- \int_{\kappa}^{\kappa^*} \frac{\lambda \hat{f}(\kappa) \kappa^*}{(r + \kappa + \lambda \mu_s^{1/1+z})} d\kappa 
= \int_{\kappa}^{\kappa_2} \frac{\lambda \hat{f}(\kappa) (r + \lambda \mu_s^{1/1+z}) (\kappa - \kappa^*)}{(r + \kappa + \lambda \mu_s^{1/1+z})} d\kappa > 0. \] (40)

Similarly,
\[ \int_{\kappa}^{\kappa^*} \frac{\lambda \hat{f}(\kappa) (r + \kappa + \lambda \mu_s^{2/1+z})}{(r + \kappa + \lambda \mu_s^{2/1+z})} d\kappa 
- \int_{\kappa}^{\kappa^*} \frac{\lambda \hat{f}(\kappa) \kappa^*}{(r + \kappa + \lambda \mu_s^{2/1+z})} d\kappa < 0. \] (41)
Combining equations (40) and (41) with (39), we find
\[ \mu_s^1 - \mu_s^2 + \frac{\kappa^*}{(r + \kappa^*)} \left[ \mu_s^1 \int_{\kappa}^{\kappa^*} \frac{\lambda \hat{f}(\kappa)}{(r + \kappa + \lambda \mu_s^{1/1+z})} d\kappa 
- \mu_s^2 \int_{\kappa^*}^{\kappa} \frac{\lambda \hat{f}(\kappa)}{(r + \kappa + \lambda \mu_s^{1/1+z})} d\kappa \right] > 0. \]
Combining this equation with (35) and (36), we find

\[ \mu_1^s - \mu_2^s + \frac{\kappa^*}{(r + \kappa^*)(1 + z)} \left[ \mu_1^s \left( \frac{S}{\mu_2^s} - 1 \right) - \mu_2^s \left( \frac{S}{\mu_1^s} - 1 \right) \right] > 0 \]

\[ \Rightarrow (\mu_1^s - \mu_2^s) \left[ 1 + \frac{\kappa^*}{(r + \kappa^*)(1 + z)} \left[ \frac{S(\mu_1^s + \mu_2^s)}{\mu_1^s \mu_2^s} - 1 \right] \right] > 0. \]

Since the term in brackets is positive, we have \( \mu_1^s > \mu_2^s \).

To show that the equilibrium is unique, it suffices to show that for any \( \kappa^* \) that solves equation (39), the derivative of the LHS w.r.t. \( \kappa^* \) is strictly positive. Denoting the LHS by \( F(\kappa^*, \mu_1^s, \mu_2^s) \), we have

\[ \frac{dF(\kappa^*, \mu_1^s, \mu_2^s)}{d\kappa^*} = \frac{\partial F(\kappa^*, \mu_1^s, \mu_2^s)}{\partial \kappa^*} + \frac{\partial F(\kappa^*, \mu_1^s, \mu_2^s)}{\partial \mu_1^s} \frac{d\mu_1^s}{d\kappa^*} + \frac{\partial F(\kappa^*, \mu_1^s, \mu_2^s)}{\partial \mu_2^s} \frac{d\mu_2^s}{d\kappa^*}. \]

We will show that the partial derivatives w.r.t. \( \kappa^* \) and \( \mu_1^s \) are strictly positive, while that w.r.t. \( \mu_2^s \) is strictly negative. Since \( d\mu_1^s/d\kappa^* > 0 \) and \( d\mu_2^s/d\kappa^* < 0 \), this will imply that \( dF(\kappa^*, \mu_1^s, \mu_2^s)/d\kappa^* > 0 \). Setting

\[ g^i(\kappa) \equiv \frac{\lambda \hat{f}(\kappa)}{(\kappa + \lambda \mu_1^s) (r + \kappa + \lambda \mu_2^s (1 + z))}, \]

we have

\[ \frac{\partial F(\kappa^*, \mu_1^s, \mu_2^s)}{\partial \kappa^*} = \frac{\lambda \mu_1^s \hat{f}(\kappa^*)}{(r + \kappa^*)(1 + z)(\kappa^* + \lambda \mu_2^s)} + \frac{\lambda \mu_2^s \hat{f}(\kappa^*)}{(r + \kappa^*)(1 + z)(\kappa^* + \lambda \mu_1^s)} \]

\[ + \frac{\lambda \mu_1^s \mu_2^s \frac{z}{1 + z}}{(r + \kappa^*)^2 (1 + z)} \left[ \int_{\kappa^*}^\infty g^1(\kappa) d\kappa - \int_{\kappa^*}^\infty g^2(\kappa) d\kappa \right], \]

\[ \frac{\partial F(\kappa^*, \mu_1^s, \mu_2^s)}{\partial \mu_1^s} = 1 + \frac{r + \kappa^* + \lambda \mu_2^s \frac{z}{1 + z}}{(r + \kappa^*)(1 + z)} \int_{\kappa^*}^\infty g^2(\kappa) d\kappa - \mu_2^s \left[ \frac{\lambda \frac{z}{1 + z}}{(r + \kappa^*)(1 + z)} \int_{\kappa^*}^\infty g^1(\kappa) d\kappa \right] \]

\[ + \mu_2^s \left[ \frac{\lambda \frac{z}{1 + z}}{r + \kappa + \lambda \mu_1^s \frac{z}{1 + z}} \right], \]

\[ 32 \]
\[
\frac{\partial F(\kappa^*, \mu_s^1, \mu_s^2)}{\partial \mu_s^2} = -1 - \frac{r + \kappa^* + \lambda \mu_s^1 z}{(r + \kappa^*)(1 + z)} \int_{\kappa}^{\infty} g^1(\kappa) d\kappa + \mu_s^1 \frac{\lambda z}{1 + z} \int_{\kappa}^{\infty} g^2(\kappa) d\kappa
\]
\[
- \mu_s^1 \frac{r + \kappa^* + \lambda \mu_s^1 z}{(r + \kappa^*)(1 + z)} \int_{\kappa}^{\infty} g^2(\kappa) d\kappa + \mu_s^2 \left[ \frac{\lambda}{\kappa + \lambda \mu_s^2} + \frac{\lambda z}{1 + z} \right] d\kappa.
\]

Consider first the equation for \(\partial F(\kappa^*, \mu_s^1, \mu_s^2)/\partial \kappa^*\). To show that the RHS is positive, it suffices to show that the term in brackets is positive. The latter follows by writing equation (39) as
\[
\mu_s^1 - \mu_s^2 + \frac{\mu_s^1 - \mu_s^2}{1 + z} \int_{\kappa}^{\infty} g^2(\kappa) d\kappa - \mu_s^2 \frac{r + \kappa^* + \lambda \mu_s^1 z}{(r + \kappa^*)(1 + z)} \left[ \int_{\kappa}^{\infty} g^1(\kappa) d\kappa - \int_{\kappa}^{\infty} g^2(\kappa) d\kappa \right] = 0,
\]
and recalling that \(\mu_s^1 > \mu_s^2\). Consider next the equation for \(\partial F(\kappa^*, \mu_s^1, \mu_s^2)/\partial \mu_s^1\). To show that the RHS is positive, it suffices to show that the sum of the first three terms is positive. The latter follows by writing equation (39) as
\[
\mu_s^1 \left[ 1 + \frac{r + \kappa^* + \lambda \mu_s^2 z}{(r + \kappa^*)(1 + z)} \int_{\kappa}^{\infty} g^2(\kappa) d\kappa - \mu_s^2 \frac{\lambda z}{1 + z} \int_{\kappa}^{\infty} g^1(\kappa) d\kappa \right]
- \mu_s^2 \left[ 1 + \frac{1}{1 + z} \int_{\kappa}^{\infty} g^1(\kappa) d\kappa \right] = 0.
\]

Consider finally the equation for \(\partial F(\kappa^*, \mu_s^1, \mu_s^2)/\partial \mu_s^2\). To show that the RHS is negative, it suffices to show that the sum of the first three terms is negative. The latter follows in the same way as for \(\partial F(\kappa^*, \mu_s^1, \mu_s^2)/\partial \mu_s^1\).

**Proof of Proposition 3:** Property (a) follows from \(\mu_s^1 > \mu_s^2\) and property (b). To prove property (b), we note that since \(\kappa > \kappa^*\) in market 1 and \(\kappa < \kappa^*\) in market 2, \(E^1 < 1\) and \(E^2 > 1\). Equation (38) then implies that
\[
(r + \kappa^*)(\mu_s^1 - \mu_s^2) + \lambda \frac{1}{1 + z} (\mu_s^1 \mu_s^2 - \mu_s^2 \mu_s^1) < 0
\]
\[
\Rightarrow \frac{\lambda}{1 + z} (\mu_s^1 \mu_s^2 - \mu_s^2 \mu_s^1) > (r + \kappa^*)(\mu_s^1 - \mu_s^2) > 0,
\]

33
which, in turn, implies property (b).

We finally prove property (c). Substituting the price from equation (34), we have to prove that

\[
1 - \frac{r}{1 + z r + \kappa + \lambda \mu s} \left[ \frac{1}{1 + z r + \kappa + \lambda \mu s} \right] < \frac{1 - \frac{r}{1 + z r + \kappa + \lambda \mu s}}{1 + \lambda \mu s b \left[ \frac{1}{1 + z r + \kappa + \lambda \mu s} \right]}. 
\]

Dividing both sides by equation (37), we can write this inequality as \(G(\mu_1 s) < G(\mu_2 s)\), where the function \(G(\mu)\) is defined by

\[
G(\mu) \equiv \frac{\left[ 1 - \frac{r}{1 + z r + \kappa + \lambda \mu s} \right] [r + \kappa^* + \lambda \mu \frac{z}{1 + z}]}{\mu}.
\]

Given that \(\mu_1 s > \mu_2 s\), the inequality \(G(\mu_1 s) < G(\mu_2 s)\) will follow if we show that \(G(\mu)\) is decreasing. Simple calculations show that

\[
G'(\mu) = -\frac{r + \kappa^*}{\mu^2} \left[ 1 - \frac{r}{(1 + z)(r + \kappa + \lambda \mu s \frac{z}{1 + z})} - \frac{r \lambda \mu \frac{z}{1 + z} (r + \kappa^* + \lambda \mu s \frac{z}{1 + z})}{(1 + z)(r + \kappa + \lambda \mu s \frac{z}{1 + z})^2 (r + \kappa^*)} \right].
\]

The term in brackets is increasing in both \(\kappa\) and \(\kappa^*\), and is equal to \(z/(1 + z) > 0\) for \(\kappa = \kappa^* = 0\). Therefore, it is positive, and thus \(G(\mu)\) is decreasing.

**Proof of Proposition 4:** In a symmetric equilibrium, equation (37) must hold for all \(\kappa^*\). This is equivalent to \(\mu_1 s = \mu_2 s = \mu s\) (from Lemma 1), and

\[
\mu_1 b E_b \left[ \frac{1}{r + \kappa + \lambda \mu s \frac{z}{1 + z}} \right] = \mu_2 b E_b \left[ \frac{1}{r + \kappa + \lambda \mu s \frac{z}{1 + z}} \right]. \tag{42}
\]

It is easy to check that there is a continuum of functions \(\nu^1(\kappa)\) such that the two scalar equations \(\mu_1 s = \mu_2 s = \mu s\) and (42) hold. Additionally, plugging these equations in equation (34), we find \(p^1(\kappa) = p^2(\kappa)\) for all \(\kappa\).

Instead of proving Lemma 2, we prove a more general lemma that (i) covers non-steady states (where population measures, expected utilities, and prices, vary on time), and (ii)
does not require that the measures of inactive owners and sellers add up to the asset supply, as must be the case in equilibrium. We extend our welfare criterion to non-steady states as

\[ W_t \equiv \sum_{i=1,2} \left[ \int_{\kappa} \left[ v_{b,t}^i(\kappa) \hat{\mu}_{b,t}^i(\kappa) + v_{o,t}^i(\kappa) \hat{\mu}_{o,t}^i(\kappa) \right] d\kappa + v_{s,t}^i \mu_{s,t}^i \right. \\
+ \left. \int_t^\infty \left[ \int_{\kappa} v_{b,t'}^i(\kappa) \hat{f}(\kappa) \nu^i(\kappa) d\kappa \right] e^{-r(t'-t)} dt' \right], \]

using the second subscript to denote time, and considering, for generality, welfare at any time \( t \).

**Lemma 4**

\[ W_t = \sum_{i=1}^2 \int_t^\infty \left[ \delta(\mu_{o,t'}^i + \mu_{s,t'}^i) - x \mu_{s,t'}^i \right] e^{-r(t'-t)} dt'. \quad (43) \]

**Proof:** To prove the lemma, it suffices to show that

\[ \frac{d(W_t e^{-rt})}{dt} = -\sum_{i=1}^2 \left[ \delta(\mu_{o,t}^i + \mu_{s,t}^i) - x \mu_{s,t}^i \right] e^{-rt}, \quad (44) \]

since we can integrate this equation to equation (43). Using the definition of \( W_t \), we find

\[ \frac{d(W_t e^{-rt})}{dt} = \sum_{i=1,2} A^i e^{-rt}, \]

where

\[ A^i = \int_{\kappa} \left[ \frac{dv_{b,t}^i(\kappa)}{dt} \hat{\mu}_{b,t}^i(\kappa) + v_{b,t}^i(\kappa) \frac{d\hat{\mu}_{b,t}^i(\kappa)}{dt} + \frac{dv_{o,t}^i(\kappa)}{dt} \hat{\mu}_{o,t}^i(\kappa) + v_{o,t}^i(\kappa) \frac{d\hat{\mu}_{o,t}^i(\kappa)}{dt} \right] d\kappa \\
+ \frac{dv_{s,t}^i}{dt} \mu_{s,t}^i + v_{s,t}^i \frac{d\mu_{s,t}^i}{dt} \\
- r \left[ \int_{\kappa} \left[ v_{b,t}^i(\kappa) \hat{\mu}_{b,t}^i(\kappa) + v_{o,t}^i(\kappa) \hat{\mu}_{o,t}^i(\kappa) \right] d\kappa + v_{s,t}^i \mu_{s,t}^i \right] \\
- \int_{\kappa} v_{b,t}^i(\kappa) \hat{f}(\kappa) \nu^i(\kappa) d\kappa. \quad (45) \]
To simplify equation (45), we compute the derivatives of the population measures and of the expected utilities. The derivative of a population measure is equal to the difference between the inflow and the outflow associated to that population. Proceeding as in section 3.1, we find

\[
\frac{d\hat{\mu}_{i,b,t}(\kappa)}{dt} = \hat{f}(\kappa)\nu_i(\kappa) - \kappa\hat{\mu}_{i,b,t}(\kappa) - \lambda\hat{\mu}_{i,b,t}(\kappa)\mu_{s,t}^i, \tag{46}
\]

\[
\frac{d\hat{\mu}_{i,o,t}(\kappa)}{dt} = \lambda\hat{\mu}_{i,o,t}(\kappa)\mu_{s,t}^i - \kappa\hat{\mu}_{i,o,t}(\kappa), \tag{47}
\]

and

\[
\frac{d\mu_{i,s,t}}{dt} = \int_{\kappa}^{\pi} [\kappa\hat{\mu}_{i,b,t}(\kappa) - \lambda\hat{\mu}_{i,o,t}(\kappa)\mu_{s,t}^i] d\kappa. \tag{48}
\]

To compute the derivatives of the expected utilities, consider, for example, \(v_{b,t}^i(\kappa)\). For non-steady states, equation (7) generalizes to

\[
v_{b,t}^i(\kappa) = (1 - rdt) \left[ \kappa dt + \lambda\mu_{s,t}^i(v_{o,t}^i(\kappa) - p_{i,t}^i(\kappa)) + (1 - \lambda\mu_{s,t}^i dt - \kappa dt) v_{b,t}^i + dt \right]. \tag{49}
\]

Rearranging, we find

\[
r v_{b,t}^i(\kappa) - \frac{dv_{b,t}^i(\kappa)}{dt} = -\kappa v_{b,t}^i(\kappa) + \lambda\mu_{s,t}^i(v_{o,t}^i(\kappa) - p_{i,t}^i(\kappa) - v_{b,t}^i(\kappa)). \tag{50}
\]

We similarly find

\[
r v_{o,t}^i(\kappa) - \frac{dv_{o,t}^i(\kappa)}{dt} = \delta + \kappa(v_{s,t}^i - v_{o,t}^i(\kappa)), \tag{51}
\]

and

\[
r v_{s,t}^i - \frac{dv_{s,t}^i}{dt} = \delta - x + \int_{\kappa}^{\pi} \lambda\hat{\mu}_{i,b,t}(\kappa)(p_{i,t}^i(\kappa) - v_{s,t}^i) d\kappa. \tag{52}
\]

Plugging equations (46)-(48) and (50)-(52) into (45), and canceling terms, we find

\[A^i = -\delta\mu_{o,t}^i - (\delta - x)\mu_{s,t}^i,\]

which proves equation (44).

**Proof of Proposition 5:** We only derive equation (16), as equations (17) and (18) can be derived using the same procedure. Suppose that at time \(t\), the measure of buyers with
switching rates in \([\kappa, \kappa + d\kappa]\) in market \(i\), is increased by \(\epsilon\), while all other measures remain as in the steady state. That is,

\[
\tilde{\mu}_{b,t}^i(\kappa) = \hat{\mu}_{b,t}^i(\kappa) + \frac{\epsilon}{d\kappa}, \tag{53}
\]

\[
\hat{\mu}_{b,t}^i(\kappa') = \hat{\mu}_{b,t}^i(\kappa') \text{ for } \kappa' \notin [\kappa, \kappa + d\kappa], \hat{\mu}_{o,t}^i(\kappa') = \hat{\mu}_{o,t}^i(\kappa') \text{ for all } \kappa', \text{ and } \mu_{s,t}^i = \mu_{s}^i, \text{ where measures without the time subscript refer to the steady state.}
\]

We will determine the change in population measures at time \(t + dt\). Consider first the buyers with switching rates in \([\kappa, \kappa + d\kappa]\). Equation (46) implies that

\[
\hat{\mu}_{b,t+dt}^i(\kappa) = \hat{\mu}_{b,t}^i(\kappa) + \left[ \hat{f}(\kappa)\nu^i(\kappa) - \kappa \hat{\mu}_{b,t}^i(\kappa) - \lambda \hat{\mu}_{b,t}^i(\kappa)\mu_{s,t}^i \right] dt. \tag{54}
\]

Plugging equations (53) and \(\mu_{s,t}^i = \mu_{s}^i\) into (54), and using the steady-state version of (54), i.e.,

\[
\hat{f}(\kappa)\nu^i(\kappa) - \kappa \hat{\mu}_{b,t}^i(\kappa) - \lambda \hat{\mu}_{b,t}^i(\kappa)\mu_{s}^i = 0,
\]

we find

\[
\hat{\mu}_{b,t+dt}^i(\kappa) = \hat{\mu}_{b,t}^i(\kappa) + \frac{\epsilon}{d\kappa}(1 - \kappa dt - \lambda \mu_{s}^i dt).
\]

Thus, the measure of buyers with switching rates in \([\kappa, \kappa + d\kappa]\), increases by \(\epsilon(1 - \kappa dt - \lambda \mu_{s}^i dt) = \epsilon \Delta_{b}^i(\kappa)\). In a similar manner, equation (47) implies that the measure of inactive owners with switching rates in \([\kappa, \kappa + d\kappa]\) increases by \(\epsilon \lambda \mu_{s}^i dt = \epsilon \Delta_{o}^i(\kappa)\), and equation (48) implies that the measure of sellers decreases by \(\epsilon \lambda \mu_{s}^i dt = \epsilon \Delta_{s}^i\). Finally, the measures of buyers and inactive owners with \(\kappa' \notin [\kappa, \kappa + d\kappa]\) do not change in order \(dt\).

Equation (43) implies that

\[
\mathcal{W}_t = \sum_{i=1}^{2} \left[ \delta(\mu_{o,t}^i + \mu_{s,t}^i) - \mu_{s,t}^i \right] dt + (1 - rd t)\mathcal{W}_{t+dt}.
\]

The derivative of \(\mathcal{W}_t\) w.r.t. \(\epsilon\) at \(\epsilon = 0\) is \(V_{b}^i(\kappa)\). The derivative of the term in brackets is zero, since \(\mu_{o,t}^i = \mu_{o}^i\) and \(\mu_{s,t}^i = \mu_{s}^i\). Finally, the derivative of \(\mathcal{W}_{t+dt}\) is \(\Delta_{b}(\kappa) V_{b}^i(\kappa) + \Delta_{o}(\kappa) V_{o}^i(\kappa) - \Delta_{s} V_{s}^i\). Thus,

\[
V_{b}^i(\kappa) = (1 - rd t) \left[ \Delta_{b}(\kappa) V_{b}^i(\kappa) + \Delta_{o}(\kappa) V_{o}^i(\kappa) - \Delta_{s} V_{s}^i \right].
\]
Rearranging this equation, we find equation (16).

**Proof of Proposition 6:** Equations (16)-(18) are the same as equations (19)-(21), except that \(z/(1+z)\) and \(1/(1+z)\) are both replaced by 1. Therefore, to compute \(V^i_b(\kappa)\), we can follow the same steps as when computing \(v^i_b(\kappa)\) in the proof of Proposition 1. Instead of equation (33), we now find

\[
V^i_b(\kappa) = \frac{\lambda \mu^i_s x}{(r + \kappa) (r + \kappa + \lambda \mu^i_s) \left[ 1 + \lambda \mu^i_b E^i_b \left[ \frac{1}{r + \kappa + \lambda \mu^i_s} \right] \right]}.
\]

Using this equation, the inequality \(V^1_b(\kappa^*) < V^2_b(\kappa^*)\) is equivalent to

\[
\frac{\mu^1_s}{r + \kappa^* + \lambda \mu^1_s + \lambda \mu^1_b E^1_b \left[ \frac{r + \kappa^* + \lambda \mu^1_b}{r + \kappa + \lambda \mu^1_s} \right]} < \frac{\mu^2_s}{r + \kappa^* + \lambda \mu^2_s + \lambda \mu^2_b E^2_b \left[ \frac{r + \kappa^* + \lambda \mu^2_b}{r + \kappa + \lambda \mu^2_s} \right]}.
\]

(55)

Dividing both sides by equation (37), we obtain the equivalent inequality

\[
\frac{r + \kappa^* + \lambda \mu^1_s \frac{z}{1+z} + \lambda \mu^1_b E^1_b \left[ \frac{r + \kappa^* + \lambda \mu^1_b}{r + \kappa + \lambda \mu^1_s} \right]}{r + \kappa^* + \lambda \mu^1_s + \lambda \mu^1_b E^1_b} < \frac{r + \kappa^* + \lambda \mu^2_s \frac{z}{1+z} + \lambda \mu^2_b E^2_b \left[ \frac{r + \kappa^* + \lambda \mu^2_b}{r + \kappa + \lambda \mu^2_s} \right]}{r + \kappa^* + \lambda \mu^2_s + \lambda \mu^2_b E^2_b}.
\]

(56)

Since for \(\kappa > \kappa^*\),

\[
\frac{r + \kappa^* + \lambda \mu^1_s \frac{z}{1+z}}{r + \kappa + \lambda \mu^1_s} > \frac{r + \kappa^* + \lambda \mu^2_s \frac{z}{1+z}}{r + \kappa + \lambda \mu^2_s},
\]

we have

\[
E^1_b \left[ \frac{r + \kappa^* + \lambda \mu^1_s}{r + \kappa + \lambda \mu^1_s} \right] > E^1.
\]

We similarly have

\[
E^2_b \left[ \frac{r + \kappa^* + \lambda \mu^2_s}{r + \kappa + \lambda \mu^2_s} \right] < E^2.
\]

Therefore, to show equation (56), it suffices to show that

\[
\frac{r + \kappa^* + \lambda \mu^1_s \frac{z}{1+z} + \lambda \mu^1_b E^1_b}{r + \kappa^* + \lambda \mu^1_s + \lambda \mu^1_b E^1_b} < \frac{r + \kappa^* + \lambda \mu^2_s \frac{z}{1+z} + \lambda \mu^2_b E^2_b}{r + \kappa^* + \lambda \mu^2_s + \lambda \mu^2_b E^2_b},
\]

(57)
which is equivalent to

\[(r + \kappa^*) \left[ (\mu_s^1 - \mu_s^2) \frac{1}{1 + z} + (\mu_b^1 E^1 - \mu_b^2 E^2) \frac{z}{1 + z} \right] + \lambda (\mu_s^2 \mu_b^1 E^1 - \mu_s^1 \mu_b^2 E^2) \frac{z - 1}{1 + z} > 0. \tag{57} \]

Equation (38) implies that

\[\lambda \frac{1}{1 + z} (\mu_s^2 \mu_b^1 E^1 - \mu_s^1 \mu_b^2 E^2) = (r + \kappa^*) (\mu_s^1 - \mu_s^2). \tag{58} \]

Using this equation to substitute \(\mu_s^2 \mu_b^1 E^1 - \mu_s^1 \mu_b^2 E^2\) in equation (57), we find the equivalent equation

\[(\mu_s^1 - \mu_s^2) \frac{z^2}{1 + z} + (\mu_b^1 E^1 - \mu_b^2 E^2) \frac{z}{1 + z} > 0. \]

This equation holds because (i) \(\mu_s^1 > \mu_s^2\), and (ii) \(\mu_b^1 E^1 > \mu_b^2 E^2\) (which follows from equation (58) and \(\mu_s^1 > \mu_s^2\)).

**Proof of Proposition 7:** From Lemma 2, maximizing \(W\) is equivalent to minimizing \(\mu_s^1 + \mu_s^2\). We will first minimize \(\mu_s^1 + \mu_s^2\) through the choice of a “trigger” allocation, i.e., through the choice of a cutoff \(\kappa_w^*\) such that \(\nu^1(\kappa) = 1\) for \(\kappa > \kappa_w^*\), and \(\nu^1(\kappa) = 0\) for \(\kappa < \kappa_w^*\).

We will show that this constrained problem, \((P_c)\), has a unique solution. We will next show that this solution, together with the symmetric solution obtained by switching the indices of the two assets, are the only solutions to the unconstrained problem \((P)\).

Lemma 3 implies that the derivative of \(\mu_s^1 + \mu_s^2\) w.r.t. \(\kappa_w^*\) is

\[
\frac{\lambda \hat{f}(\kappa_w^*)}{\kappa_w^*} \left[ \frac{\mu_s^1}{\kappa_w^* + \lambda \mu_s^1 + \int_{\kappa_w^*}^{\pi} \frac{\lambda f(\kappa)(\kappa^*_w + \lambda \mu_s^1)}{(\kappa + \lambda \mu_s^1)^2} d\kappa} - \frac{\mu_s^2}{\kappa_w^* + \lambda \mu_s^2 + \int_{\kappa_w^*}^{\pi} \frac{\lambda f(\kappa)(\kappa^*_w + \lambda \mu_s^2)}{(\kappa + \lambda \mu_s^2)^2} d\kappa} \right]. \tag{59} \]

Multiplying by the denominators, we find that the term in brackets has the same sign as

\[F \equiv \mu_s^1 - \mu_s^2 + \mu_s^1 \frac{1}{\kappa_w^*} \int_{\kappa_w^*}^{\pi} \frac{\lambda \hat{f}(\kappa)(\kappa^*_w + \lambda \mu_s^1)}{(\kappa + \lambda \mu_s^1)^2} d\kappa - \mu_s^2 \frac{1}{\kappa_w^*} \int_{\kappa_w^*}^{\pi} \frac{\lambda \hat{f}(\kappa)(\kappa^*_w + \lambda \mu_s^2)}{(\kappa + \lambda \mu_s^2)^2} d\kappa. \]

Proceeding as in the existence proof of Proposition 2, we can show that there exists \(\kappa_w^* \in (\kappa, \bar{\kappa})\) such that \(F = 0\), and moreover, that for any \(\kappa_w^*\) solving \(F = 0\), we have \(\mu_s^1 > \mu_s^2\).
Proceeding as in the uniqueness proof of Proposition 2, we can show that for any $\kappa^*_w$ solving $F = 0$, the derivative of $F \text{ w.r.t. } \kappa^*_w$ is positive. This implies that $\kappa^*_w$ is unique. It also implies that $F$ is negative and then positive, and thus $\kappa^*_w$ corresponds to a minimum of $\mu_1^s + \mu_2^s$.

To show that the solution to $(P_c)$, together with its symmetric solution, are the only solutions to $(P)$, we proceed by contradiction, and assume that there is a third allocation $\nu^1(\kappa)$ for which $\mu_1^s + \mu_2^s$ is weakly lower. Since assets 1 and 2 are symmetric, we can assume that $\nu^1(\kappa)$ satisfies $\mu_1^s \geq \mu_2^s$. Given the first part of the proof, we can also assume that $\nu^1(\kappa)$ is not a trigger allocation. Define $\kappa'$ by

$$\int_{\kappa}^{\kappa'} \frac{\hat{f}(\kappa)}{\kappa(\kappa + \lambda \mu_2^s)} d\kappa = \int_{\kappa}^{\kappa} \frac{\hat{f}(\kappa)\nu^2(\kappa)}{\kappa(\kappa + \lambda \mu_2^s)} d\kappa,$$

and consider the corresponding trigger allocation. From the definition of $\kappa'$, the measure $\mu_2^s$ of sellers in market 2 under the allocation $\nu^1(\kappa)$, solves also equation (6) under the new allocation. Therefore, this measure is the same under both allocations. We next show that

$$\int_{\kappa}^{\kappa'} \frac{\hat{f}(\kappa)}{\kappa(\kappa + \lambda \mu_2^s)} d\kappa \geq \int_{\kappa}^{\kappa} \frac{\hat{f}(\kappa)\nu^1(\kappa)}{\kappa(\kappa + \lambda \mu_2^s)} d\kappa,$$

and that the inequality is strict if $\mu_1^s > \mu_2^s$. This will imply that the measure $\mu_1^s$ of sellers in market 1 under $\nu^1(\kappa)$ is greater than the solution to equation (6) under the new allocation, and strictly so if $\mu_1^s > \mu_2^s$. This will contradict the fact that $\nu^1(\kappa)$ is a solution to $(P)$. (The contradiction for $\mu_1^s = \mu_2^s$ is because $\nu^1(\kappa)$ will be equivalent to a trigger allocation with $\mu_1^s = \mu_2^s$, but such an allocation is not optimal from the first part of the proof.)

Equation (60) implies that

$$\int_{\kappa'}^{\kappa} \frac{\hat{f}(\kappa)}{\kappa(\kappa + \lambda \mu_2^s)} d\kappa = \int_{\kappa}^{\kappa} \frac{\hat{f}(\kappa)\nu^1(\kappa)}{\kappa(\kappa + \lambda \mu_2^s)} d\kappa.$$

Equation (62), together with the fact that $\nu^1(\kappa)$ gives non-zero weight to values below $\kappa'$ (since it is not a trigger allocation), and the fact that the function $1/(\kappa + \lambda \mu_1^s)$ is decreasing in $\kappa$, imply that

$$\int_{\kappa'}^{\kappa} \frac{\hat{f}(\kappa)}{\kappa(\kappa + \lambda \mu_2^s)(\kappa + \lambda \mu_1^s)} d\kappa < \int_{\kappa}^{\kappa} \frac{\hat{f}(\kappa)\nu^1(\kappa)}{\kappa(\kappa + \lambda \mu_2^s)(\kappa + \lambda \mu_1^s)} d\kappa.$$
Multiplying equation (63) by $\lambda(\mu^1_s - \mu^2_s)$, and subtracting it from equation (62), we obtain equation (61).

**Proof of Proposition 8:** Consider the trigger allocation with cutoff $\hat{\kappa}$, and denote by $W(\hat{\kappa})$ the welfare under this allocation. From Proposition 7, $W(\hat{\kappa})$ is increasing for $\hat{\kappa} < \kappa^*_w$, and decreasing for $\hat{\kappa} > \kappa^*_w$.

We next show that the cutoff $\kappa^*$ in the clientele equilibrium satisfies $\kappa^* < \kappa^*_w$. For this, it suffices to show that the function $F$ of Proposition 7 is negative for $\kappa^*$. Using equation (59), and noting that $E^i_b \left[ \frac{1}{\kappa + \lambda \mu^i_s} \right] = \frac{1}{\mu^i_b} \int_{\kappa}^{\hat{\kappa}} \frac{\hat{f}(\kappa)}{\kappa + \lambda \mu^i_s} \mu^i_b(\kappa) d\kappa$, equation $F < 0$ is equivalent to

$$\frac{\mu^1_s}{\kappa^* + \lambda \mu^1_s + \lambda \mu^1_b E^1_b \left[ \frac{\kappa^* + \lambda \mu^1_s}{\kappa + \lambda \mu^1_s} \right]} < \frac{\mu^2_s}{\kappa^* + \lambda \mu^2_s + \lambda \mu^2_b E^2_b \left[ \frac{\kappa^* + \lambda \mu^2_s}{\kappa + \lambda \mu^2_s} \right]}.$$

For small $r$, this equation is equivalent to (55), which holds from Proposition 6.

The cutoff $\kappa'$ for which the measure of sellers is the same across the two markets obviously satisfies $\kappa' < \kappa^*$. Since $\kappa' < \kappa^* < \kappa^*_w$, and the function $W(\hat{\kappa})$ is increasing for $\hat{\kappa} < \kappa^*_w$, we have $W(\kappa') < W(\kappa^*)$. Since, in addition, $W(\kappa')$ is equal to the welfare $W_s$ in any symmetric equilibrium (by the argument in Footnote 18), we have $W_s < W(\kappa^*)$.

**Proof of Proposition 9:** To show that a clientele equilibrium exists, it suffices to show that there exists $\kappa^*$ such that when (a) entry decisions are given by $\nu^1(\kappa) = 1$ for $\kappa > \kappa^*$, and $\nu^1(\kappa) = 0$ for $\kappa < \kappa^*$, (b) population measures are given as in Section 3.1, and (c) expected utilities and prices are given by equations (9) and (22)-(24), $v^1_b(\kappa) - v^2_b(\kappa)$ has the same sign as $\kappa - \kappa^*$. Simple algebra shows that the solution to the system of equations (9) and (22)-(24) is

$$v^i_b(\kappa) = \frac{\lambda \mu^i_b \left[ \frac{r}{r + \kappa} \left( r + \kappa^i + \lambda \mu^i_s \frac{z}{1+z} \right) - \frac{r}{1+z} \right] x}{r \left( r + \kappa + \lambda \mu^i_s \right) \left( r + \kappa^i + \lambda \mu^i_b \frac{1}{1+z} + \lambda \mu^i_s \frac{z}{1+z} \right)}, \quad (64)$$

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\[ v_s^i(\kappa) = \frac{\delta}{r} - \frac{\kappa \left( r + \kappa^i + \mu_s^i \frac{z}{1+z} \right) x}{r (r + \kappa) \left( r + \kappa^i + \mu_s^i \frac{1}{1+z} + \lambda \mu_s^i \frac{z}{1+z} \right)}, \tag{65} \]

\[ v_s^i = \frac{\delta}{r} - \frac{\left( r + \kappa^i + \lambda \mu_s^i \frac{z}{1+z} \right) x}{r \left( r + \kappa^i + \lambda \mu_s^i \frac{1}{1+z} + \lambda \mu_s^i \frac{z}{1+z} \right)}, \tag{66} \]

\[ p^i = \frac{\delta}{r} - \frac{\left( r \frac{z}{1+z} + \kappa^i + \lambda \mu_s^i \frac{z}{1+z} \right) x}{r \left( r + \kappa^i + \lambda \mu_s^i \frac{1}{1+z} + \lambda \mu_s^i \frac{z}{1+z} \right)}. \tag{67} \]

We next show that there exists \( \kappa^* \) such that \( v_b^1(\kappa^*) = v_b^2(\kappa^*) \). For this, we treat \( \kappa^* \) as a free variable, \( \kappa^i, \mu_s^i, \) and \( \mu_b^i, \) as functions of \( \kappa^*, \) and look for a solution to equation

\[ v_b^1(\kappa^*) - v_b^2(\kappa^*) = 0. \tag{68} \]

The LHS of this equation is negative for \( \kappa^* = \kappa' \), from condition (C). To show that it is positive for \( \kappa^* = \bar{\kappa} \), we write it as

\[ H(\kappa^1, \mu_s^1, \mu_b^1) - H(\kappa^2, \mu_s^2, \mu_b^2), \]

where the function \( H \) is defined by

\[ H(\ell, \mu_s, \mu_b) \equiv \frac{\lambda \mu_s \left( \frac{r}{r+\kappa^*} \left( r + \ell + \lambda \mu_s \frac{z}{1+z} \right) - \frac{r}{1+z} \right)}{\left( r + \kappa^* + \lambda \mu_s \right) \left( r + \ell + \lambda \mu_b \frac{1}{1+z} + \lambda \mu_s \frac{z}{1+z} \right)}, \]

and is increasing in \( \ell \) and \( \mu_s \), and decreasing in \( \mu_b \). For \( \kappa^* = \bar{\kappa} \), we have \( \kappa^1 = \kappa^2 = \bar{\kappa}, \mu_s^1 = S, \mu_s^2 < S, \mu_b^1 = 0, \) and \( \mu_b^2 > 0 \). Therefore, the LHS of equation (68) is positive, and thus this equation has a solution \( \kappa^* \in (\kappa', \bar{\kappa}) \). Since \( \kappa^* > \kappa' \), and since \( \mu_s^1 \) is increasing in \( \kappa^* \) and \( \mu_s^2 \) is decreasing in \( \kappa^* \), we have \( \mu_s^1 > \mu_s^2 \).

We next consider the sign of \( v_b^1(\kappa) - v_b^2(\kappa) \). This sign is the same as that of

\[ \frac{v_b^1(\kappa)}{v_b^1(\kappa^*)} - \frac{v_b^2(\kappa)}{v_b^2(\kappa^*)}, \]

and from equation (64) it is the same as that of

\[ \frac{\left( r + \bar{\kappa} + \lambda \mu_s^1 \frac{z}{1+z} - \frac{r+\kappa^*}{1+z} \right) \left( r + \kappa^* + \lambda \mu_s^1 \right)}{\left( r + \bar{\kappa} + \lambda \mu_s^1 \frac{z}{1+z} - \frac{r+\kappa^*}{1+z} \right) \left( r + \kappa + \lambda \mu_s^1 \right)} - \frac{\left( r + \kappa^* + \lambda \mu_s^2 \frac{z}{1+z} - \frac{r+\kappa^*}{1+z} \right) \left( r + \kappa + \lambda \mu_s^2 \right)}{\left( r + \kappa^* + \lambda \mu_s^2 \frac{z}{1+z} - \frac{r+\kappa^*}{1+z} \right) \left( r + \kappa + \lambda \mu_s^2 \right)}. \]

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Multiplying by the denominators, this has the same sign as

\[
(r + \kappa^* + \lambda \mu_s^2) \left[ \left( r + \kappa + \lambda \mu_s^1 \frac{z}{1 + z} - \frac{r + \kappa}{1 + z} \right) \left( r + \kappa + \lambda \mu_s^1 \right) \left( r + \kappa + \lambda \mu_s^2 \right) \frac{z}{1 + z} \right. \\
- \left. \left( r + \kappa + \lambda \mu_s^1 \frac{z}{1 + z} - \frac{r + \kappa^*}{1 + z} \right) \left( r + \kappa + \lambda \mu_s^1 \right) \left( r + \kappa^* + \lambda \mu_s^2 \frac{z}{1 + z} - \frac{r + \kappa}{1 + z} \right) \right].
\]

Simple algebra shows that the term in brackets is equal to

\[
(\kappa - \kappa^*) \left[ \frac{1}{1 + z} (r + \kappa + \lambda \mu_s^1) + \lambda (\mu_s^1 - \mu_s^2) \frac{z}{1 + z} (r + \kappa + \lambda \mu_s^1) \right],
\]

and has the same sign as \( \kappa - \kappa^* \), since \( \mu_s^1 > \mu_s^2 \). Therefore, a clientele equilibrium exists.

We next prove properties (a)-(c). Property (a) follows from \( \mu_s^1 > \mu_s^2 \) and property (b). To prove property (b), we note that since the function \( H \) is increasing in \( \ell \),

\[
H(\kappa^*, \mu_s^1, \mu_b^1) < H(\kappa^*, \mu_s^1, \mu_b^1) = v_b^1(\kappa^*) = v_b^2(\kappa^*) = H(\kappa^*, \mu_s^2, \mu_b^2).
\]

Since

\[
H(\kappa^*, \mu_s, \mu_b) = \frac{\lambda \mu_s \frac{r}{r + \kappa} \frac{z}{1 + z}}{r + \kappa^* + \lambda \mu_b \frac{1}{1 + z} + \lambda \mu_s \frac{z}{1 + z}},
\]

we can write the above inequality as

\[
\frac{\mu_s^1}{r + \kappa^* + \lambda \mu_b \frac{1}{1 + z} + \lambda \mu_s \frac{z}{1 + z}} < \frac{\mu_s^2}{r + \kappa^* + \lambda \mu_b \frac{1}{1 + z} + \lambda \mu_s \frac{z}{1 + z}}.
\]

Multiplying by the denominators, and using the property \( \mu_s^1 > \mu_s^2 \), we find property (b).

We finally prove property (c). Substituting the price from equation (67), we have to prove that

\[
\frac{r \frac{z}{1 + z} + \kappa^1 + \lambda \mu_s^1 \frac{z}{1 + z}}{r + \kappa^1 + \lambda \mu_b \frac{1}{1 + z} + \lambda \mu_s \frac{z}{1 + z}} < \frac{r \frac{z}{1 + z} + \kappa^2 + \lambda \mu_s^2 \frac{z}{1 + z}}{r + \kappa^2 + \lambda \mu_b \frac{1}{1 + z} + \lambda \mu_s \frac{z}{1 + z}}.
\]

Dividing both sides by equation \( v_b^1(\kappa^*) = v_b^2(\kappa^*) \), we can write this inequality as \( G(\kappa^1, \mu_s^1) < G(\kappa^2, \mu_s^2) \), where the function \( G(\ell, \mu) \) is defined by

\[
G(\ell, \mu) \equiv \frac{(r \frac{z}{1 + z} + \ell + \lambda \mu \frac{z}{1 + z}) (r + \kappa^* + \lambda \mu)}{(r + \ell + \lambda \mu \frac{z}{1 + z} - \frac{r + \kappa^*}{1 + z}) \lambda \mu}.
\]

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Since $G(\ell, \mu)$ is decreasing in $\ell$ and $\mu$, and since $\kappa^1 > \kappa^2$ and $\mu^1_s > \mu^2_s$, inequality $G(\kappa^1, \mu^1_s) < G(\kappa^2, \mu^2_s)$ holds.

**Proof of Proposition 10**: We first show Condition (25). This condition can be written as

\[ v^i_o(\kappa^i) - v^i_b(\kappa^i) \geq \left[ P^i_b(\kappa)(v^i_o(\kappa) - v^i_b(\kappa)) + (1 - P^i_b(\kappa))v^i_s \right] \]
\[ \iff (1 - P^i_b(\kappa))(v^i_o(\kappa) - v^i_b(\kappa)) \geq v^i_o(\kappa) - v^i_b(\kappa) - (v^i_o(\kappa^i) - v^i_b(\kappa^i)). \]  

(69)

To show that this equation holds, we use equations (64)-(66). Combining equations (64) and (65), we find

\[ v^i_o(\kappa) - v^i_b(\kappa) = \frac{\delta}{r} - \frac{\left[ (r + \kappa^i + \lambda\mu^i_s z_{1+z}) (r + \kappa + \lambda\mu^i_s) \right]}{r \left( r + \kappa + \lambda\mu^i_s \right) \left( r + \kappa^i + \lambda\mu^i_b \frac{1}{1+z} + \lambda\mu^i_s \frac{z}{1+z} \right)}. \]

(70)

which for $\kappa = \kappa^i$ simplifies into

\[ v^i_o(\kappa^i) - v^i_b(\kappa^i) = \frac{\delta}{r} - \frac{\left( \kappa^i + \lambda\mu^i_s \frac{z}{1+z} \right) x}{r \left( r + \kappa^i + \lambda\mu^i_b \frac{1}{1+z} + \lambda\mu^i_s \frac{z}{1+z} \right)}. \]

(71)

Equations (66) and (70) imply that

\[ v^i_o(\kappa) - v^i_b(\kappa) - v^i_s = \frac{(r + \kappa^i + \lambda\mu^i_s) x}{(r + \kappa + \lambda\mu^i_s) \left( r + \kappa^i + \lambda\mu^i_b \frac{1}{1+z} + \lambda\mu^i_s \frac{z}{1+z} \right)}, \]

and equations (70) and (71) imply that

\[ v^i_o(\kappa) - v^i_b(\kappa) - (v^i_o(\kappa^i) - v^i_b(\kappa^i)) = \frac{r(\kappa^i - \kappa)x}{r \left( r + \kappa + \lambda\mu^i_s \right) \left( r + \kappa^i + \lambda\mu^i_b \frac{1}{1+z} + \lambda\mu^i_s \frac{z}{1+z} \right)}. \]

Equation (69) is thus equivalent to

\[ \frac{1 - P^i_b(\kappa)}{\kappa^i - \kappa} \left( r + \kappa^i + \lambda\mu^i_s \right) \geq 1. \]

(72)

To show that equation (72) holds for $S$ large enough, we determine the asymptotic behavior of $\mu^i_s$. Equations (1) and (3) imply that

\[ \mu^i_b = \int_{\kappa}^{\kappa^i} \frac{S \hat{F}(\kappa)}{\kappa + \lambda\mu^i_s} d\kappa \]

(73)
and equation (6) implies that
\[
\int_{\ell^i}^{\kappa^i} \frac{\lambda \mu_{s} S \hat{F}(\kappa)}{\kappa + \lambda \mu_{s} \hat{F}(\kappa)} d\kappa + \mu_{s} = S,
\]
where \(\ell^i\) denotes the minimum switching rate of a buyer in market \(i\) (i.e., \(\ell^1 = \kappa^*\) and \(\ell^2 = \kappa\)). Adding equation (74) for \(i = 1\) to the same equation for \(i = 2\), and using equation (26), we find
\[
- \int_{\kappa^*}^{\kappa} \frac{S \hat{F}(\kappa)}{\kappa + \lambda \mu_{s}^1} d\kappa - \int_{\kappa}^{\kappa'} \frac{S \hat{F}(\kappa)}{\kappa + \lambda \mu_{s}^2} d\kappa + \mu_{s}^1 + \mu_{s}^2 = 0.
\] (75)
Suppose now that \(\mu_{s}^1\) goes to a finite limit when \(S\) goes to \(\infty\). Equation (75) implies that \(\mu_{s}^2\) is of order \(S\), and equation (73) implies that \(\mu_{b}^1\) is of order \(S\) and \(\mu_{b}^2\) is of order 1. Equation (23) then implies that \(v_{b}^1(\kappa^*)\) goes to zero and \(v_{b}^2(\kappa^*)\) goes to \(x/(r + \kappa^*) > 0\), which is inconsistent with \(v_{b}^1(\kappa^*) = v_{b}^2(\kappa^*)\). Therefore, \(\mu_{s}^1\) must go to \(\infty\) when \(S\) goes to \(\infty\), and
\[
P_b^i(\kappa) = \frac{\int_{\ell^i}^{\kappa} \frac{S \hat{F}(y)}{y + \lambda \mu_{s}^1} dy}{\int_{\ell^i}^{\kappa} \frac{S \hat{F}(y)}{y + \lambda \mu_{s}^1} dy} \to \frac{\int_{\ell^i}^{\kappa} \hat{F}(y) dy}{\int_{\ell^i}^{\kappa} \hat{F}(y) dy}.
\]
Equation (72) thus holds for \(S\) large enough if the function
\[
L^i(\kappa) \equiv \frac{1}{\kappa^i - \kappa} \int_{\ell^i}^{\kappa} \hat{F}(y) dy
\]
is bounded away from zero for \(\kappa \in [\ell^i, \kappa^i]\). This follows because \(L^i\) is continuous in the compact set \([\ell^i, \kappa^i]\) (it can be extended by continuity for \(\kappa = \kappa^i\)), and is strictly positive since \(\hat{F}(\kappa) > 0\).

We next show Condition (C). From the definition of \(\kappa^i\), we have \(\mu_{s}^1 = \mu_{s}^2 \equiv \mu_{s}\). Using equation (64), we can then write inequality \(v_{b}^1(\kappa') < v_{b}^2(\kappa')\) as
\[
\frac{r + \kappa^i + \lambda \mu_{s} \frac{z}{1+\nu} - r+\kappa' \frac{z}{1+\nu}}{r + \kappa^i + \lambda \mu_{b}^1 \frac{z}{1+\nu} + \lambda \mu_{s} \frac{z}{1+\nu}} < \frac{r + \kappa' + \lambda \mu_{s} \frac{z}{1+\nu} - r+\kappa' \frac{z}{1+\nu}}{r + \kappa' + \lambda \mu_{b}^2 \frac{z}{1+\nu} + \lambda \mu_{s} \frac{z}{1+\nu}}.
\]

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Simple algebra shows that this equation is equivalent to
\[
\lambda (\mu_b^1 - \mu_b^2) \frac{z}{1+z} (r + \kappa' + \lambda \mu_s) > (\kappa - \kappa')(r + \kappa' + \lambda \mu_b^2).
\] (76)

To show that equation (76) holds for \( S \) large enough, we determine the asymptotic behavior of \( \mu_s \) and \( \mu_b^i \). For \( \mu_s^1 = \mu_s^2 = \mu_s \), equation (75) becomes
\[
- \int_{\kappa}^{\kappa'} \frac{S \hat{F}(\kappa)}{\kappa + \lambda \mu_s} d\kappa + 2 \mu_s = 0,
\]
and it implies that
\[
\mu_s \sim \sqrt{S \int_{\kappa}^{\kappa'} \hat{F}(\kappa) d\kappa / 2\lambda}.
\]

Equation (73) then implies that
\[
\mu_b^i \sim \sqrt{\frac{2S}{\lambda \int_{\kappa}^{\kappa'} \hat{F}(\kappa) d\kappa \int_{\kappa}^{\kappa'} \hat{F}(\kappa) d\kappa}}.
\]

Therefore, the LHS of equation (76) is of order
\[
S \lambda \frac{z}{1+z} \left( \int_{\kappa}^{\kappa'} \hat{F}(\kappa) d\kappa - \int_{\kappa}^{\kappa'} \hat{F}(\kappa) d\kappa \right),
\] (77)
while the RHS is of order \( \sqrt{S} \). Equation (76) thus holds if the term in parenthesis in equation (77) is strictly positive. Since \( \mu_s \) goes to \( \infty \) when \( S \) goes to \( \infty \), equation (74) implies that \( \kappa' \) goes to a limit such that
\[
\int_{\kappa}^{\kappa'} \frac{\hat{F}(\kappa)}{\kappa} d\kappa = \int_{\kappa}^{\kappa'} \hat{F}(\kappa) d\kappa = 1.
\]

Therefore,
\[
\int_{\kappa'}^{\kappa} \hat{F}(\kappa) d\kappa > \kappa' \int_{\kappa'}^{\kappa} \frac{\hat{F}(\kappa)}{\kappa} d\kappa = \kappa' \int_{\kappa}^{\kappa'} \frac{\hat{F}(\kappa)}{\kappa} d\kappa > \int_{\kappa}^{\kappa'} \hat{F}(\kappa) d\kappa.
\]
References


